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I. INTRODUCTION 
Looking back on his career, John Frederick Charles Fuller reflected that the years 
between 1933 and 1939 were “probably the most interesting years of my life.”
1
 His 
description of his activities during that period deserves to be quoted in full: 
I travelled a good deal in Europe, because I was convinced that its entire political and 
social foundations were in the melting-pot; that new systems were boiling up, and that it 
was of the utmost importance to discover their trend. I met Hitler first in December, 
1934, and was the sole foreign journalist at his first maneouvres in the following year; 
subsequently I met him some half a dozen times, and was one of the two Englishmen 
who attended his 50
th
 birthday celebrations in 1939 – a most interesting occasion. In 
1935-36, for some three months, I was the Daily Mail war correspondent in the Italo-
Abyssinian War, and on my way out had a private interview in Rome with Mussolini. As 
a free-lance journalist I went to Spain three times during the Civil War, and met Franco 
on one occasion. During this period I contacted many of the leading German, Italian and 
Spanish generals and politicians – Blomberg, Fritch, Beck, Badoglio, de Bono, Chiano, 
Moscardo, Quipo de Llano, etc., etc.
2
 
 
Fuller’s political and journalistic activities during the 1930s involved him closely in 
many of the most significant events of his lifetime. He witnessed the two smaller 
European conflicts that preceded the outbreak of the Second World War firsthand. He 
met the dictators of Italy, Germany and Nationalist Spain, as well as many of their 
foremost military commanders. He was a thoughtful observer of the European “melting-
pot,” which was then in the process of producing what he euphemistically termed “new 
systems.” But Fuller was not a purely objective or dispassionate follower of developing 
trends, as his self-justificatory account suggests. Throughout much of the decade he was 
a self-styled fascist, as well as an influential member of Britain’s foremost fascist party. 
His curiosity about the “new systems” emerging abroad was inspired by sympathy for 
Europe’s fascist and National Socialist regimes. He believed that the “melting pot” in 
                                                 
1
 J. F. C. Fuller to William Sloane, April 18, 1962, box 3, J. F. C. Fuller Papers, Rutgers University, New 
Brunswick, NJ.  
2
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 2 
which Europe’s “entire political and social foundations” were submerged heralded the 
emergence of a new totalitarian political order. 
 In spite of Fuller’s own claims about the importance and interest of his activities 
during the 1930s, his significance as a historical figure rests mainly on his contributions 
to the development of military thought. Brian Holden Reid classed J. F. C. Fuller – 
alongside his friend and collaborator, Captain B. H. Liddell Hart – as Britain’s sole 
military theorist of the “first water.”
3
 Born in 1878, Fuller spent his childhood in a 
respectable bourgeois atmosphere, “the undistinguished child of an Anglican 
clergyman.”
4
 He displayed a marked predilection for intellectualism and autodidacticism 
from a young age, preferring reading to other pursuits.
5
  At the age of nineteen he was 
sent into the British Army “on the strength of a family whim.”
6
 He fought as an infantry 
officer in South Africa during the Boer War, spending a period of time as the commander 
of ragtag police force tasked with suppressing Boer guerrilla activity in a wide region of 
the Veldt.
7
 During lulls in the fighting, Fuller found the time to read some 200 books on 
subjects ranging from history to philosophy and religion.
8
 It was at this time that he 
began to develop his personal philosophy, which was heavily influenced by intellectual 
currents that were well outside the Victorian mainstream.
9
 He lost his religious faith and 
developed a strong interest in Darwinism evolution, reading works by a wide variety of 
                                                 
3
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 3 
authors including Carlyle, Heraclitus and Kant.
10
 As Brian Holden Reid explained in his 
study of Fuller’s military thought, “…at the beginning of his career, Fuller identified 
himself with a major intellectual current, and one that owed little to the democratic, 
empirical English tradition.”
11
  
While stationed in India after the end of the Boer War, Fuller’s intellectual 
interests broadened and became increasingly esoteric. In 1906, he entered a contest to 
write the best essay on the collected works of Aleister Crowley.
12
 Fuller’s entry won – 
and his essay ultimately provided the basis for his first book, The Star in the West.
13
 
Fuller became a close associate of Aleister Crowley for a period of about five years, 
writing for the occult journal The Equinox. Even after breaking off from Crowley’s circle 
in 1911, Fuller retained a lively interest in the mystical and the occult, writing a number 
of books on subjects such as Yoga and Kabbalah, which form an interesting contrast 
alongside his military and political works. Fuller claimed that it was only around this 
time that he developed a serious interest in military affairs. He applied and was accepted 
to the Staff College at Camberly in 1913, although his studies were interrupted by the 
outbreak of the First World War.
14
 He spent the first part of the war in relatively 
undistinguished positions, only achieving his breakthrough when he was appointed as a 
staff officer to the nascent Tank Corps in December 1916.
15
 After that point, Fuller 
became closely involved in efforts to develop effective mechanized tactics. He was 
quickly convinced that the tank offered the best means by which the horrendous 
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 4 
bloodshed on the western front might be reduced or eliminated altogether. His arguments 
in favor of mechanization helped to win over official support to the Tank Corps, which 
subsequently played an important role in a number of British offensives – most 
dramatically in the battles of Cambrai (1917) and Amiens (1918), both of which Fuller 
helped to plan.
16
 Towards the end of the war, Fuller produced perhaps his most well-
known contribution to military thought, the outline of a plan for a tank offensive 
commonly known as “Plan 1919.” In that work, which Reid described as “the most 
famous unused plan in military history,”
 17
 Fuller explained how a hypothetical high 
speed tank could be used to achieve a large-scale breakthrough in the German lines. After 
the initial breakthrough, armored spearheads would seek out and destroy the command 
apparatus of the German army far behind the trenches. Without effective leadership, 
Fuller reasoned, the German armies would collapse. The British, French and American 
armies could advance on a wide front, possibly ending the war in a single blow.
18
 
While the armistice in 1918 ensured that “Plan 1919” would never be attempted, 
the ideas that the plan expressed formed the basis for much of Fuller’s subsequent 
military thought. After the war, Fuller became one of the foremost proponents of the 
mechanization of the British Army. Together with Liddell Hart, he campaigned actively 
in favor of the preservation and expansion of the Tank Corps. The bloodshed of 1914-
1918 left him convinced that the errors of trench warfare should never be repeated. He 
was certain that mechanization – the application of modern technology to war – provided 
the surest guarantee against a future descent into stalemate and attrition. Fuller published 
a number of books in which he elucidated his theory of warfare. His ideas were for the 
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 5 
most part better received by the younger officers of the British Army – and by members 
of foreign militaries – than by the senior military leadership that actually had the power 
to put them into effect. His in-depth study of military theory in fact received official 
disapproval. Future Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Archibald Montgomery-
Massingbird, refused to even read one of Fuller’s books, declaring to Liddell Hart that “it 
would only annoy me!”
19
 Fuller was briefly given a truly golden opportunity to shape the 
development of Britain’s armored forces when he was offered command of the 
Experiment Force at Tidworth in 1927.
20
 He accepted the position, but instantly objected 
to the fact that he was to be given command of several infantry units in addition to the 
Experimental Force itself – something he considered to be an unnecessary and 
burdensome distraction. He ultimately went so far as to offer his resignation over the 
matter. Although his resignation was refused, command of the Experimental Force 
passed to another officer.
21
 Fuller was never offered a position of comparable 
significance again. He was not given any employment at all after 1931 and was finally 
placed on the retired list in December 1933. The reforms that he had championed for over 
a decade were still far from being realized. 
Bitter over the British Army’s failure to give him suitable appointment, Fuller had 
no further interest in attempting to change the military from the inside: 
As far as I am concerned [he wrote] they may keep their appointments. I do not seek 
them; what I should like is some civil employment, and as such, in the present chaotic 
state of the world, are hard to come by, I have fallen back on the pen and intend to use it 
whether the W.O. like it or not. What I write is neither scandalous or libelous or even 
personal, and an officer on half-pay can write what he likes. I see no reason why I should 
discontinue doing so.
22
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New Brunswick, NJ.  
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He would indeed derive much of his income from “the pen” for the remainder of his life. 
His established body of published work allowed him to transition fairly easily into a 
career in journalism, which he immediately began to use as a platform to advance his 
military views. He also drifted into political activism, becoming a member of the New 
Britain Group, a minor organization which was dedicated to political and philosophical 
debate and which published its own periodical.
23
 Already, his political writing was 
distinctly fascist in tone; he expressed strong admiration for the European fascist states, 
which seemed to compare very favorably to Britain. In the summer of 1934, he took the 
fateful step of joining Oswald Mosley’s British Union of Fascists. He would be 
associated with the BUF and with British fascism in general throughout the remainder of 
the decade. 
 J. F. C. Fuller’s participation in the British fascist movement has proved to be 
difficult to assess. He was undoubtedly a very prominent member of the BUF, ranking 
alongside other leadership figures such as Robert Forgan and John Beckett (both of them 
former MPs), and William Joyce (later infamous during the Second World War as “Lord 
Haw Haw”).
24
 As Martin Pugh explained, Fuller became “a key figure in BUF 
organization as well as a parliamentary candidate.”
25
 There is nevertheless considerable 
confusion concerning the precise nature of his role within the BUF, as well as the details 
of his political beliefs. Within the literature on British fascism and the BUF, he has been 
variously described as a violent extremist and as a moderate. On the one hand Thomas 
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 7 
Linehan classed Fuller as one of the leaders of the “moderate” faction within the BUF, 
alongside the former conservative party agent F. M. Box.
26
 On the other hand, D. S. 
Lewis argued in his book, Illusions of Grandeur: Mosley, Fascism and British Society, 
1939-81, that Fuller was a “reactionary,” who neglected the more progressive elements of 
the BUF’s economic policy “in favor of railing against Jews, communists, democrats, and 
those who failed to take the necessary precautions to ensure the perpetuation of the 
British empire and Christian church.”
27
  According to Richard Thurlow, Fuller was 
particularly notable within the BUF for his extreme anti-Semitism, being the author of 
one of the “most virulent of all anti-semitic diatribes in the inter-war period.”
28
 Thomas 
Linehan asserted that Fuller’s fascist thought was thoroughly anti-modernist, and that he 
was opposed to urbanization and plagued with “disquiet about the machine and Fordist 
mass standardization…”
29
 Patrick Glenn Zander, in his unpublished dissertation, “Right 
Modern: Technology, Nation, and Britain’s Extreme Right in the Interwar Period (1919-
1940),” argued to the contrary that Fuller’s political activities were dominated by a 
“consistent, almost dogmatic campaign for technical modernization and rationality of 
approach.”
30
 The picture of Fuller’s political activities and beliefs that emerges from 
these separate accounts is confused and inconsistent.  
 The confusion about Fuller’s political commitments during the 1930s extends into 
the literature on J. F. C. Fuller himself. Many students of Fuller’s military thought have 
downplayed his involvement in fascism, arguing that his controversial political stance 
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 8 
during the years prior to the outbreak of the Second World War was a passing fancy, the 
error of a largely apolitical army officer embittered by ill-treatment by his military 
superiors.  Fuller’s obituary in the Times, which described his “unhappy phase of 
flirtation with fascism, which seems to have been due to high-mindedness having taken a 
wrong turning,” is typical.
31
 While more recent writing on Fuller has discussed his 
involvement with the BUF in more detail, his political activities during the 1930s 
nevertheless remain poorly understood. As Brian Holden Reid acknowledged in the 
foreword to his essay on “Fuller, Liddell Hart, and the Odyssey of British Fascism: Two 
Contrasting Attitudes to Political Tumult,” the most comprehensive and up-to-date 
account of Fuller’s participation in the BUF, “much more work remains to be done on 
Fuller’s political affiliations.”
32
 
 There are several reasons why the details of Fuller’s involvement in the BUF (and 
of his broader political views) have remained so elusive. Most notable among them is the 
surprising dearth of documentary evidence from that period of Fuller’s life. Fuller 
claimed in 1962 that the bulk of his personal archives from before the Second World War 
had been destroyed by German bombs during the Blitz.
33
 For whatever reason, there are 
far fewer letters and documents remaining from the years between 1933 and 1939 than 
from almost any other period of Fuller’s life. This has naturally had negative 
consequences for historians studying his activities in the British fascist movement, and is 
most likely the explanation for the relative lack of emphasis that the years between 1933 
and 1939 have received in studies of his life and thought. This is probably the reason, for 
                                                 
31
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 Reid, Studies in British Military Thought, 183. 
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example, that Brian Holden Reid devoted so little attention to Fuller’s political views in 
the 1930s in his book, J. F. C. Fuller: Military Thinker. Studies of fascism in Britain, on 
the other hand, have been hindered by the sheer breadth of Fuller’s literary output. 
Between 1930 and 1940, Fuller wrote no fewer than sixteen books (he wrote over forty in 
total). He was also extremely active as a journalist, publishing numerous articles in a 
wide range of periodicals. The massive quantity of Fuller’s writing has made accurate 
assessment of his ideas extremely difficult. Historians such as Thomas Linehan have 
been led to draw mistaken conclusions about Fuller’s political beliefs simply because 
they erroneously regarded a small range of his works as presenting an accurate 
representation of his political thought in general – for example, this seems to have been 
the reason for Linehan’s belief that Fuller was an anti-modernist: Linehan’s discussion of 
Fuller drew from a limited selection of Fuller’s works,  particularly The Dragon’s Teeth 
and War and Western Civilization, both of which were published prior to Fuller’s 
association with British fascism. Claudia Baldoli was led to form almost the precisely 
wrong conclusion about Fuller’s attitude towards Italian fascism – that Fuller was an 
extreme Italophile – for the same reason.
34
  
 This is intended to help to resolve the various misunderstandings regarding J. F. 
C. Fuller’s role in the British Union of Fascists by providing a comprehensive account of 
his political activities and thought between the years 1934 and 1939. This has been made 
possibly partly by Nicholas Mosley’s decision to donate his father’s personal papers to 
Birmingham University. The personal archives of Oswald Mosley, the leader of the 
British Union of Fascists, include a number of letters and reports by J. F. C. Fuller, which 
                                                 
34
 Claudia Baldoli, "Anglo-Italian Solidarity? The Shift from Italophilia to Naziphilia in the BUF," in The 
Culture of Fascism: Visions of the Far Right in Britain (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 159. 
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help to fill in the details of his role within the BUF. I have also uncovered several reports 
by Fuller, held along with his personal papers at Rutgers University, which have hitherto 
remained unknown. These provide essential information for understanding Fuller’s 
activities as a war correspondent, which were central to the development of his political 
views during the 1930s. Altogether, this paper is intended to clarify Fuller’s role within 
British fascism, and to provide a comprehensive account of his political thought during 
his “fascist decade.” A clearer understanding of the political beliefs and activities of one 
of the foremost leaders of the BUF will in turn contribute to the general understanding of 
the British fascist movement as a whole. 
 J. F. C. Fuller was, according to his own description, a “full-blooded fascist.” 
What this meant in practice was considerably complex. Fuller brought to the British 
Union of Fascists the same drive for reform and rationalization that he had exhibited 
throughout his career in the British Army. He did not accept fascist ideology uncritically. 
The ideas that were most important to his conception of fascism – the distrust of popular 
democracy, the belief in the need for a western spiritual revival and the conviction that 
society and government should be organized along the lines suggested by advancements 
in science and technology – were all derived from strong currents in his pre-fascist 
thought. Fuller regarded British fascism as a vehicle for bringing Britain into the modern 
age. By his association with Oswald Mosley, he hoped that he would be well positioned, 
if the BUF achieved power, to bring about the military reforms that he had long 
considered necessary. His peculiar conception of history, what he termed the “natural 
history of warfare,” convinced him that political change inevitably followed 
technological progress – and that fascism, as the political expression appropriate to 
 11 
modernity, was therefore fated to achieve success by historical necessity. Perhaps the 
overriding theme of Fuller’s contributions to the BUF was his insistence that fascism in 
Britain assume a particularly British (as opposed to Italian or German) form. He 
attempted to guide the BUF throughout the 1930s towards policies that were consistent 
with what he considered to be fundamental British values, including a limited respect for 
social traditions and for parliamentary democracy. His experience of continental fascism 
gained during his employment as a war correspondent in the Italian-Ethiopian War and 
the Spanish Civil War – in addition to his frequent visits to Nazi Germany – reaffirmed 
his belief that fascism, as it was expressed on the European continent, was admirable but 
ultimately unsuitable to the character of the British people.  
Fuller was nevertheless not purely an agent for moderation within the British 
fascist movement. From his earliest involvement in the BUF, he expressed support for a 
virulent form of anti-Semitism that gradually came to exercise a disproportionate 
influence over his political and military thought. Fuller was moreover strongly 
sympathetic towards Hitler and Nazi Germany. He believed that it was in Britain’s 
interest to develop a strong friendship with Germany and – as conflict between Britain 
and Germany became increasingly likely towards the end of the decade – he became 
closely involved in a number of pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic causes. Fuller’s enthusiastic 
support for Nazism and ant-Semitism make it clear that he was not simply a moderate 
influence on British fascism. While Fuller did argue in favor of moderating the BUF’s 
message, he was also strongly associated with the most extreme elements of fascist 
thought and of the British pro-Nazi political fringe. His involvement with fascism 
therefore cannot be explained away as an essentially harmless error committed out of 
 12 
political naïveté. Far from an eccentric misadventure, Fuller’s involvement with British 
fascism in fact represented the consummation of the philosophy that he had developed 
over the course of his life. In the particular vision of fascist ideology to which he 
subscribed, Fuller believed that he had found the solution to the political, military and 
even spiritual problems that he had devoted much of his career to solving.  
 
II. “A NEW WORLD CONCEPTION” 
 “Looking back over thirty-five years of service,” J. F. C. Fuller wrote in 1936, “I 
feel that it is a duty to myself…to appraise what I accomplished, not during the war, for 
whatever was then done was of a transient nature; but, instead, during those years in 
which I became a wandering student, one who, leaving the beaten track of military 
thought, sought new ideas in directions but little explored.”
35
 Fuller’s achievements in the 
Royal Tank Corps, including the drafting of “Plan 1919” and subsequent efforts to 
produce a theory of mechanized tactics, were in Fuller’s own estimation relatively 
unimportant. The ultimate development of mechanization was inevitable, a product of 
underlying historical forces rather than individual personalities or even cataclysmic world 
events: “Had I never lived,” Fuller admitted, “and even had there never been a World 
War, mechanization would have appeared among us in its own good time.”
36
 It was rather 
his later works, in which he appealed to a civilian rather than a military audience, “and 
more particularly to those who are politically minded,” which Fuller imagined would 
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36
 Ibid., 453. 
 13 
prove of lasting interest to posterity, for “in them is to be found anything which the future 
may judge to be of worth.”
37
  
The main themes of Fuller’s civilian-directed writing were, alongside military 
history, the broader questions of war and international politics. Fuller devoted increasing 
time and energy to these subjects throughout the latter half of the 1920s. By the early 
1930s, abstract political and philosophical topics – as well as military history – had all 
but eclipsed Fuller’s earlier, narrow focus on mechanized tactics. His last book on tank 
tactics, a collection of lectures that he had given while serving as chief instructor at the 
Royal Staff College, was published in 1932 under the title Lectures on FSR III. By that 
time, Fuller’s body of work already indicated his shifting interest: a survey of British 
military history, Imperial Defense, 1588-1914 (1926), was followed by the publication of 
On Future Warfare (1928); another military historical study, The Generalship of Ulysses 
S. Grant (1929), was succeeded by an in-depth discussion of the problem of nationalism 
in India, India in Revolt (1931). By the middle of the 1930s, Fuller had abandoned the 
study of land tactics – the field in which he had made his reputation – almost entirely, 
returning to it in only a handful of articles over the course of the decade. He explained 
this shift in his intellectual output as a product of his intensive study of the strategic 
problems of the First World War. He had been led to turn his attention towards what he 
termed the “natural history of war” by the troubling world order created by Paris Peace 
Conference;
38
 he sought to explain the origin of the 1914-1918 war and, proceeding from 
his observation that the First World War had emerged “out of a state of peacefulness,” he 
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concluded that the causes of war “must be sought in that state.”
39
 As a result Fuller had 
effectively devoted himself to the construction of a general theory of international 
relations. 
Even before his conversion to fascism, Fuller’s views on international affairs were 
characterized by a strongly-expressed abhorrence of democracy and mass rule. Described 
in his Memoirs, Fuller elevated antidemocratic sentiment to the level of a general 
historical and philosophical methodology.  
My philosophy, such as it is, is founded upon skepticism, and…this skepticism helped me 
to realise that mass opinions are generally wrong, because mentally the masses are 
seldom less than a generation out of date. When, in 1918, they shouted, “Hang the 
Kaiser!” they were at least a thousand years out of date, and when, in 1919, they insisted 
upon the ruin of Germany they cast back to the mentality of the Thirty years War. There 
is, consequently, no magic in my system: if the masses yell “black!” I start with white 
and then examine it and ascertain whether it may not be grey or some other colour.
40
 
 
A strict adherence to this antidemocratic method underlay much of Fuller’s analysis of 
world history and international affairs. Distaste for mass politics led Fuller naturally to 
view emergent anti-democratic movements as a positive force for change. Years before 
he aligned overtly with Mosley and the BUF, Fuller had come to accept the totalitarian 
regimes in Italy and Germany (and even the Soviet Union) as representative of a 
revolutionary new world historical force – one that could prove, among other things, the 
best instrument for the overthrow of the rotten democratic order. 
In The Dragon’s Teeth, the first book which he dedicated almost entirely to the 
international questions in the abstract, Fuller condemned democracy as outdated and 
unsuited for the conditions of modern life. Predominating democratic political theories, 
according to Fuller, “remained as they were before the Industrial Revolution set in.”
41
 
                                                 
39
 Ibid., 464. 
40
 Ibid., 465. 
41
 J. F. C. Fuller, The Dragon's Teeth: A Study of War and Peace (London: Constable, 1932), 164. 
 15 
Universal suffrage as it had developed in Western Europe and the United States was 
merely the latest expression of the spirit of the French Revolution, and was in 
consequence horribly out of date, for “since 1850…the structure of Western civilization 
[has] completely changed.”
42
  Mass politics, moreover – due to its unsuitability to the 
problems of industrial civilization – bore a large degree of responsibility for the tragedy 
of the First World War. The total mobilization of national populations in support of the 
war effort was just as much an expression of the ideals of the French Revolution as 
popular democracy: “As democracy, in the form of one man one vote, was the final 
expression of the French Revolution, so was that of the nation in arms, one man one 
musket, the military expression of this same upheaval.”
43
 In effect, Fuller ascribed the 
unwillingness of allied political and military leaders to recognize the importance of 
technology and embrace the revolutionary (but untried, expensive and potentially risky) 
solutions Fuller espoused to their faith in the virtues of mass. The new military 
technology introduced during the war, particularly the tank and the airplane, represented 
for Fuller the empowerment of a mechanical elite – a return to the aristocratic warfare of 
the Middle Ages. Democratic states, because of their blinkered political traditions, could 
not bring themselves to embrace the new form of warfare wholeheartedly. The mass 
casualties of the First World War were therefore a perverse triumph of the democratic 
spirit: “In this war the horde unmasked itself, and proved itself a complete failure, as the 
implement of democracy the conscript army had won out.”
44
 
Just as the masses had bungled the war itself, they also criminally mismanaged 
the peace. Fuller regarded the Treaty of Versailles as a grave injustice, which proved to 
                                                 
42
 Ibid., 256. 
43
 Ibid., 256. 
44
 Ibid., 270. 
 16 
him conclusively that democracies are “totally incapable of terminating [wars] 
honorably.”
45
 Influenced by the “hot breath of the mob,” Entente political leaders such as 
Lloyd George had dictated an iniquitous peace that had dire consequences for the 
defeated powers and for Europe as a whole.
46
 The territorial settlement created after the 
war, undertaken to placate the masses, was grossly unjust and – for the balance of power 
– fundamentally destabilizing. Drawing upon the analysis of the Versailles Treaty put 
forward in John Maynard Keynes’s Economic Consequences of the Peace, Fuller argued 
that the division of territory dictated at Versailles was unreasonable and that the 
economic costs for Germany were most likely fatal.
47
 Far from ending war itself, the 
peace treaty had in fact made the world more violent and war more likely than ever 
before.
48
 The League of Nations, as the instrument by which the postwar order was 
maintained, was worse than useless (although Fuller uncharacteristically upheld the 
League as a potential, if unlikely, avenue for the creation of a “European Economic 
Council” that would reconcile economic rivalries).
49
 A new war could in fact prove 
beneficial, as any change in the status quo could lead to a more rational world order. 
While Fuller regarded a “second world war” as a poor means to set right the iniquities of 
the international order, he nevertheless looked favorably on a potential “war of 
rectification,” which promised to “rid the existing condition of peace of its economic 
diseases; to get back, as it were, to the last war, and to conclude it as it should have been 
concluded….”
50
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Fuller’s readiness to view any disruption of the world order – including even a 
second world war – as a potentially positive development led him naturally to sympathize 
with the various undemocratic regimes that emerged after the war, believing that they 
represented a revolutionary impulse that could contribute to a general revision of the 
world order. Fuller heralded the advent of a new revolutionary force that was equally 
opposed to popular rule and materialism, which he invariably associated with 
democracy.
51
 The European world “yearns for some vague heroism – honor to the 
virtuous, government by the most able, and victory by the most valiant.”
52
 The new faith 
was politically radical and fundamentally anti-democratic, “a revolt against the ignorance 
of massed multitudes.”
53
 Interestingly, Fuller had not yet embraced fascism and was even 
prepared to consider communism alongside fascism and other ideologies as standard 
bearers of the new faith, which “in England and America…is called Communism; in Italy 
Fascism; in Turkey Despotism; in Russia Bolshevism; and in distant countries, like India 
and China, Nationalism – all vague terms for the rule of minorities, whatever may be 
their tone, shade or aspirations.”  These were the ideologies that would remake the world 
and overturn the rotten international order established by the treaty of Versailles. “The 
ideals of the French Revolution,” Fuller announced, “are to-day in their last lap, and a 
still more potent revolution is sweeping over the face of the world.”
54
 
But although Fuller saw some virtue in communism and the Soviet Union, he was 
nevertheless unwilling to give Russia his unqualified support. While Fuller praised 
industrial development in Russia, which was “advancing whilst the rest of the world is 
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falling back” – and even expressed qualified admiration for Lenin as a “man of courage,” 
the “Mahomet of the Industrial Revolution” – he still perceived the Soviet Union as a 
potential threat.
55
 Russia was fundamentally “oriental,” and any Russian military success 
would therefore result in Europe being swept by “oriental” culture.
56
 A war between 
Russia and Western Europe appeared to be inevitable.
57
 Mussolini’s Italy, more than any 
other state, appeared to Fuller to exemplify the new, revolutionary faith. Whereas Fuller 
could only imagine Russia as a potential enemy, he speculated that Italy might serve as 
an ally for Britain in a future European war.
58
 The Nazis in Germany were another 
matter. Hitler, according to Fuller, was “hailed as the German Mussolini – though far 
from being such.”
59
 The Nazis most closely resembled the German communists as both 
parties, in Fuller’s estimation, shared important goals.
60
  
By the spring of 1934, Fuller’s opinion of German National Socialism had 
softened considerably. Hitler’s seizure of power in 1933 and subsequent transformation 
of German society earned Fuller’s whole-hearted admiration. Fuller cheered Hitler’s 
efforts to restore Germany’s economy and world power, which appeared decisive steps 
towards a general revision of the international order.
61
 Nazi Germany, together with 
Mussolini’s Italy (and even the Soviet Union) exemplified the revolutionary spirit of 
youth, dynamism and modernization. Fuller, who had little respect for any military 
officer over the age of fifty, very readily valorized youthful totalitarian leaders over their 
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older democratic counterparts.
62
 The totalitarian states were firmly “in the hands of 
youth,” led by the “new men of action,” and therefore compared very favorably with the 
“septuagenarians” and “old men of debate” of the established democratic powers.
63
 
But just as Fuller’s opinion of the Nazis had improved, his view of the League of 
Nations had appreciably worsened. Fuller no longer held out even “some small hope” of 
international reconciliation through an empowered League of Nations. He rather 
denounced the League in the harshest terms, calling it “the bastard of the League of 
Nations, a pink Jew-Bolshevik baby.”
64
 The League was nothing less than the modern 
iteration of the Holy Alliance, which had sought to maintain the European order in the 
aftermath of the Congress of Vienna.
65
 Fuller expanded on his earlier critique of the 
peace settlement that followed the First World War, arguing that “it was not the war 
which wrecked Europe but the peace which followed it.”
66
 The victors had attempted to 
use the League to accomplish the impossible goal of restoring the European order that 
had obtained prior to 1870. All they had achieved, however, was the Balkanization of 
Europe – the creation of a series of new states that were neither strategically nor 
economically viable.
67
 Fuller reiterated his belief that war might prove an effective means 
to right the iniquities of Versailles, speculating that “a series of terrible explosions must 
occur until power is once again balanced on a rational plan.”
68
 He left little doubt as to 
what would prove the agent of this explosive change. “A new world conception is rising 
at our feet, a world of mighty forces” Fuller warned. “Unless we as an Empire are 
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prepared to play our part in balancing these forces, which we cannot do unless we are 
united and intelligently led, they may submerge us.”
69
 But with careful handling, Fuller 
was optimistic that this “new world conception” might prove a force for good. 
They startle us, these Mussolinis, these Hitlers and these Lenins. We proclaim them foul; 
perhaps, less than a generation hence we shall call them divine, for to-day we are so 
blinded by self-conceit that we can see nothing clearly. They are the spirits of a trampled 
world, the world of our time-marking; they are powerful emanations possessed both by 
good and evil, consequently they are intensely human.
70
 
 
Within the space of a few months, Fuller had cast in his lot with the British Union of 
Fascists, apparently convinced that the place of “these Mussolinis, these Hitlers” within 
the historical pantheon was assured. 
 
III. THE REORGANIZATION OF FASCISM 
According to Oswald Mosley’s later recollection, J. F. C. Fuller applied to join 
the British Union of Fascists the day after the party’s disastrous rally at Olympia on June 
7, 1934. The wording of Fuller’s letter was sufficiently memorable that the former fascist 
leader could recite it over forty years later: “This is the worst day of your life,” Fuller 
wrote. “You should always join a man in his worst moment.”
71
 The Olympia meeting had 
indeed been a fiasco for the BUF. According to the traditional narrative of the history of 
British fascism, it marked the end of the party’s brief flirtation with popular acceptance. 
It was the high water mark of press support for the BUF. Lord Rothermere’s influential 
newspaper empire had thrown its weight behind the Blackshirts earlier in 1934, 
publishing glowing accounts of Mosley’s speeches and praising the fascists as the saviors 
of Britain. Popular interest in the British Union of Fascists was sufficiently widespread 
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that a large section of British society, including many members of Britain’s political and 
social elite – 13,000 people in total – turned out to witness Mosley’s address at Olympia, 
one of the largest exhibition halls in London.
72
 As it happened, many anti-fascists were 
also in attendance. Almost as soon as Mosley began to speak, hecklers began to chant 
anti-fascist slogans: “Fascism Means Murder: Down with Mosley.”
73
 The BUF’s 
stewards moved in to quell the disturbance, and fighting rapidly broke out in the aisles 
and corridors around the hall. Mosley’s speech, which had been scheduled to last only an 
hour and a quarter, dragged on for over two hours due to the commotion.
74
 Many 
influential attendees were appalled by the spectacle, giving lurid accounts to the press of 
the barbarity exhibited by the fascists.
75
 Mosley’s wave of popular support rapidly 
receded. By the end of July, Lord Rothermere had withdrawn his support and the BUF 
returned to political insignificance.
76
 
Yet for J. F. C. Fuller, who was not even six months into his retirement from the 
British Army, it appeared to be the perfect time to join the BUF. Mosley recognized a 
good thing when he saw one. A number of other attendees at Olympia were sufficiently 
impressed by the fascist demonstration to consider membership in Mosley’s organization, 
but Fuller was, as Martin Pugh noted, “by far the most notable recruit.”
77
 Fuller met with 
Mosley five days later, receiving an appointment as Mosley’s advisor on questions 
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related to the military and defense.
78
 In August, Fuller received a long letter from Mosley 
asking him to “draw up a clear-cut policy on the co-ordination of defense.”
79
  
Later in the summer, Fuller wrote to Mosley indicating that he regarded the 
decline in popular support for the BUF in the wake of Olympia as a blessing in disguise. 
“I’m glad the position between you + Rothermere has been cleared up,” he wrote. “The 
press is reliable, but as an instrument only, its danger is that it always aims at mastership 
and that its principles are regulated by dividends.”
80
 British fascism would in fact be 
strengthened without the approval of the press, which was only capable of creating “great 
emotions + not great movements…”
81
 If the papers were opposed to the BUF, so much 
the better – the hostility of the press, according to Fuller,  was “…as powerful an 
advertisement as its friendship; because, anyhow in the early days of a movement, it puts 
enthusiasts on their metal and keeps out the jelly-fish.”
82
 Indeed, as he explained, 
“…hostility gives quality whilst praise, at best, is of 24 hours duration in this age of ball-
bangers and squeeze + kiss me girls.”
83
  
In the fall of 1934, Mosley decided to take advantage of Fuller’s military 
experience, asking him to compose a report on the organizational structure of the BUF.
84
 
Fuller eagerly set to work. The result was an eleven page report in which Fuller presented 
the essence of his vision for the fascist movement. “After two months’ close study at N. 
H. Q.,” Fuller wrote, “I am of opinion [sic] that the Movement cannot fail to succeed if 
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certain radical changes are made in its organization and discipline.”
85
 Failure to 
reorganize the movement and set it towards the accomplishment of a “clear cut and 
attainable object” would only result in disaster. “Unless this is done,” he declared, “I am 
of the opinion that the Movement will decline or will break up into hostile factions.”
86
 
The solution to the BUF’s organizational problem was a new orientation towards 
achieving power through constitutional means. This was to be accomplished by gaining a 
foothold in parliament.
87
 This idea contrasted with the notion, not altogether unpopular 
within the BUF, that British fascism would come to power in violent, revolutionary 
circumstances – many in the BUF believed that the Blackshirts would serve as the 
spearhead of a counterrevolutionary backlash against a potential communist uprising.
88
 
This conception of the BUF’s purpose had a particular appeal for the movement’s 
younger members. Fuller regarded it as nonsense. The parliamentary route to power was 
less dramatic, but it was more certain. It was moreover far more likely to gain widespread 
support. The BUF’s radical orientation had the effect of alienating the greater part of the 
British people:  
Of the little I have seen of propaganda [he wrote] it appears to me to be somewhat crude. 
It lacks art and common sense. In place of being persuasive it is aggressive. I agree that 
to start with a challenging spirit is necessary in order to wake people up; but now that the 
movement is on its feet…tactics must be fitted to circumstances.
89
 
 
The answer was to cut back the party’s most extreme propaganda, “diluting” fascism so 
as to make it acceptable to the conservative British temperament. “The pill must be well-
coated; it is diplomacy and not compulsion which will win over the electorates. It should 
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be remembered that for every one man and woman who applaud the words ‘revolution’ 
and ‘dictatorship’ there are ten who intensely dislike them.”
90
 In practical terms, “coating 
the pill” meant diminishing the influence of the paramilitary elements in the party. Fuller 
recommended that the wearing of the militaristic blackshirt uniform be restricted. New 
members who could potentially embarrass the BUF would have to earn the privilege of 
wearing the uniform. He explained: 
Though the wearing of the blackshirt appeals to young people, it must not be overlooked 
that this is an old country, very solid, stable and matter of fact. It is still instinctively a 
feudal country. The masses of the people will always listen to men and women of 
experience and importance, but they will seldom listen to boys and girls. They know that 
things must change, but their instincts are against violent changes. They reverence law 
and order and venerate the police as an instrument of government; but the idea that this 
position might be reversed and the government might become the instrument of the 
police or of the army appears to them to be ridiculous. 
91
 
 
If “blackshirtism” were allowed to continue, Fuller warned, the BUF’s activities could be 
reduced little more than bluster and provocation – something very far from what he called 
“philosophical” fascism.
92
 He displayed remarkable insight into the challenges facing the 
BUF, noting of the greater membership of the party that “it is not the Communists, Jews, 
etc., who are going to prevent the B.U.F. winning seats in the next election, it is 
themselves; not because they lack enthusiasm, but because they do not understand the 
conditions which exist in this country and, consequently their enthusiasm is 
misdirected.”
93
 While “blackshirtism” might be an effective propaganda tactic in some 
nations, it would never work in Britain: “In a revolutionary country they would be right, 
but in a conservative country they are wrong. They do not see that – attack, attack, attack 
is a poor policy and a somewhat ridiculous one to assume in this country.”
94
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 Fuller devoted the rest of his report to a detailed description of the specific 
changes in the command organization of the BUF that would be necessary to turn the 
movement into a viable political party. The general thrust of Fuller’s comments, 
particularly about the organization of the BUF’s national headquarters, appeared to be 
that he should be elevated into a position of leadership. He suggested that Mosley was 
unable to lead the whole of the organization alone with real efficiency, and proposed that 
the Leader become a member of a “triumvirate,” which he called “the hidden 
dictatorship.”
95
 The two members of the triumvirate apart from Mosley would advise the 
Leader, who would have the final say in all decisions. “This trinity will represent the soul 
of the Movement,” Fuller wrote. “Its existence should be kept secret.”
96
 Fuller also 
recommended that Mosley appoint a Second in Command, who would take over 
leadership of the BUF if anything happened to the Leader: “At present the very existence 
of the Movement is precarious, as it is literally a one-man show. If the Leader died or was 
for a long period incapacitated, the Movement would not only lose most of its financial 
support but would rapidly disintegrate.”
97
 That Fuller considered himself to be an ideal 
candidate either for the role of Second in Command or for membership in the triumvirate 
was clear from the letter that accompanied his report, in which he hinted very heavily that 
he wanted to be given a paid position in the BUF. If Mosley accepted his proposals, he 
wrote, “I am ready to assist anyhow for a period. I reckon it will take about 3 months to 
get the organization pulled together and 3 more before full results are seen.”
98
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 Mosley was receptive to Fuller’s recommendations. As Martin Pugh explained, 
“for all his platform braggadocio Mosley was sufficiently realistic, especially after 
1934…to see the wisdom of Fuller’s analysis.”
99
 True reorganization nevertheless would 
be delayed for over a year. In the meantime, Fuller aligned himself with F. M. Box, an 
influential member of the BUF and a former Conservative Party agent who shared his 
dedication to minimizing the radical elements within the fascist movement.
100
 Box and 
Fuller became the leaders of a faction within the British Union of Fascists which hoped to 
moderate the paramilitary and anti-parliamentary elements in the party.
101
 They were 
opposed by a more radical faction, led by William Joyce and A. K. Chesterton (among 
others), who preferred an “uncompromising fascist propaganda campaign.”
102
 Box and 
Fuller’s efforts achieved some success in spite of this opposition. By January 1935, 
National Headquarters and the fascist local defense forces were abolished. Paramilitarism 
in general gave way in favor of a more traditional party organization.
103
  
 In December, Fuller identified another aspect of the BUF that he believed 
required reform. Writing from Germany, Fuller reaffirmed the importance for the 
movement to pursue an electoral strategy: “the most important problem of the moment is 
to be in a position to establish outposts in parliament, that is a covering force for the 
winning of the elections after the next.”
104
 In the meantime, however, Fuller suggested 
that the BUF should focus on developing the intellectual content of fascism. “Quality 
depends on feeding the mind,” he wrote. “Also mental superiority over the enemy 
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stimulates enthusiasm + prestige.”
105
 The cultivation of the “mental superiority” of the 
fascist movement became one of Fuller’s chief occupations over the following several 
months. January 1935 saw the publication of the first number of Fascist Quarterly, a 
BUF periodical that was consciously intended to elevate the level of British fascist 
discourse. Fuller contributed several articles to Fascist Quarterly during the early part of 
1935, producing a notable essay on “Fascism and War,” in which he described the 
positive role he believed that a fascist government would play in bringing about military 
modernization and rationalization.  
Fuller’s best known contribution to Fascist Quarterly, however, appeared in the 
first number in January 1935. In an article titled “The Cancer of Europe,” Fuller set out to 
describe the malign Jewish conspiracy that he believed had been in motion “for over a 
thousand years.”
106
 “Having given Christianity to the world,” he wrote, “these strange 
people have never ceased in their endeavors to destroy Christian culture.”
107
 He declared 
that the Jews desired to “dominate all other races…”
108
 According to his view of history, 
“for over 1,000 years the Jews have been a world-wide power, a net of conspiracy and of 
race interests stretched over half the globe.”
109
 This sort of anti-Semitism was not entirely 
new to Fuller’s writing. Even prior to his involvement with the BUF, for instance, he had 
denounced the League of Nations as a “pink Jew-Bolshevik baby.” The force and 
vehemence of Fuller’s expression of anti-Semitism in “The Cancer of Europe” was 
nevertheless a novel and disturbing development. Fuller blamed the Jews for many of the 
destructive revolutions in world history. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, for 
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example “was almost entirely controlled and directed by Jews.”
110
 The League of Nations 
was also the product of a Jewish conspiracy, being an effort to undermine nationalism 
and to pave the way for the triumph of the Soviet Union.
111
 The Jews were even 
responsible for general moral degradation, producing “economic and moral chaos.”
112
 In 
order to create moral anarchy, Fuller explained, “immense and continuous demoralizing 
pressure is placed upon the masses, a thing easily accomplished to-day through the 
newspapers and the cinema, both of which are largely controlled by Jews…”
113
 He 
blamed nearly everything that he found distasteful in modern culture on the Jews, 
including jazz, “the latrine type of war story” (a category which included All Quiet on the 
Western Front) and the latest developments in artistic expression. “Art,” he declared, “in 
the form of painting and sculpture, has been lowered to the level of a gross animalism, 
ugliness being deified…”
114
  
Fuller’s attacks on the Jews went well beyond the typical content of fascist anti-
Semitism. He undertook to describe “Jewish magic,” which was centered around the 
Qabalah and the Zohar. “Through magic,” Fuller wrote, “not only were the Jews enabled 
to stimulate an intellectual revolt against the Church, but to gain control of the secular 
powers which were antagonistic to the Church…”
115
 The “magic” controlled by the Jews 
was practiced for centuries, giving rise to a wave of witchcraft and sorcery which spread 
throughout Europe.
116
 Ultimately, “Jewish magic” found a new expression in 
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psychoanalysis, the doctrines of which were “subversive and anti-Christian.”
117
 The 
variety of anti-Semitism to which Fuller subscribed was entirely unique – it was, as 
Linehan described it, a fusion of “extreme conspiratorial anti-semitism with medieval or 
magical anti-semitism.”
118
 Fuller’s radical anti-Semitic views provoked an immediate 
backlash, and he wrote a lengthy letter to the editor of Fascist Quarterly in response. He 
claimed absurdly that his criticism of the Jews in “The Cancer of Europe” had not been 
truly anti-Semitic. “As an Englishman I can object to the Sinn Fein movement without 
being proclaimed anti-Irish, or I can resent the crimes of Italian gangsters in Chicago 
without being classed as anti-Italian or anti-American; but once question the loyalty of 
Jewish revolutionaries and criminals, and one is forthwith proclaimed an anti-Semite, that 
is, a person so one-eyed and fanatical that he cannot recognize a good Jew from a bad 
one.”
119
 Proclaiming that he had “met not a few Jews whom I can full-heartedly respect,” 
he noted that he had “learned much from such writers as Maimonides, Avicebron and 
Spinosa…”
120
 The rest of his letter consisted of quotations from what he termed “Jewish 
sources,” which he claimed supported the arguments that he had put forward in “The 
Cancer of Europe.” At the end of his letter, he even went so far as to argue that he had 
made a special effort to “sympathize with this ‘peculiar people’ as regard their 
persecutions and to credit them with virtues which most of these critics do not deign to 
hint at.”
121
 Fuller’s comments in “The Cancer of Europe” mark him out, along with 
William Joyce and A. K. Chesterton, as one of the BUF’s most extreme anti-Semites. 
Fuller’s paranoid conspiratorial anti-Semitism however was perhaps unique within the 
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British fascist movement for its emphasis on “magic” and mysticism in general – 
elements which were influenced by Fuller’s long-standing interest in the occult. 
Altogether, it is clear that Fuller was not wholly dedicated to moderating the message and 
tactics of the BUF. Although Fuller’s organizational proposals were intended to 
transform the British Union of Fascists into a more traditional political party – one that 
would be more suited to what he conceived to be the character of the British people – his 
attempt to promote the “mental superiority” of British fascism served only to exacerbate 
the fascist movement’s extremism and political (and social) irrelevance.  
 
IV. THE ITALIAN-ETHIOPIAN WAR 
Fuller’s first year within the British Union of Fascists was unique as his efforts 
during that time were focused almost exclusively on the internal affairs (whether 
organizational or intellectual) of the party. Beginning in the summer of 1935, Fuller’s 
activities as a fascist became increasingly focused on international events – partly as a 
result of the escalating crisis in Abyssinia.  After 1935, Fuller’s principle contribution to 
the BUF would be his interaction with and response to continental fascism. But although 
Fuller would only begin to travel abroad extensively beginning in October 1935, he 
devoted some effort to the consideration of foreign fascism during his first year in the 
BUF. His principle experience abroad during this time was a short vacation in Germany, 
which he took during the winter of 1934-5. While en route to Feldberg in southern 
Germany he stopped briefly in Berlin, where he was asked “by a German of note” 
whether he wished to meet Hitler.
122
 He leapt at the opportunity and was granted an 
audience with Hitler in the old Reichskanzlerei. As Fuller recounted afterwards, their 
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conversation focused for the most part on the First World War. He was nevertheless 
impressed by Hitler’s grasp of the importance of mechanization; he was left “in no 
doubt” that Hitler recognized that resolution of the next war would depend on the use of 
mechanized arms.
123
 Fuller was very readily convinced that Hitler, the dynamic leader of 
what Fuller considered to be a modernist and “scientific” movement, would naturally 
pursue a policy of general mechanization. His principle obstacle, he reasoned, would be 
the German military leadership, “for not one of his leading generals was as yet 
‘mechanized’ in spirit, and being for the most part elderly men they were never likely to 
become so.”
124
 During their conversation, Hitler had also made the comment, illustrative 
of his political philosophy, that “the people are impotent, they cannot rule themselves; yet 
I cannot rule the people unless I am the soul of the people.”
125
 Hitler’s attitude towards 
politics and the military establishment, taken together, fit very neatly into Fuller’s 
conception of the role of the authoritarian leader in a fascist state. The Leader, the 
unchallenged representative of the people, would sweep aside all resistance to the cause 
of modernization and rationalization. 
Aside from his chance meeting with Hitler, Fuller gave relatively little 
consideration to international questions during the first months of 1935. He briefly turned 
away from his standard commentary on the poor state of Britain’s military to argue, in an 
article titled “Imperial Defense,” that Britain should assume an isolationist stance similar 
to that which had characterized British diplomacy between 1815 and 1875. Rather than 
“mixing ourselves up in the tangled net of international politics,” the British should focus 
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on rearmament and military reorganization.
126
 In place of Britain’s then-close 
involvement in the League of Nations, Fuller argued that Britain should rather seek to 
maintain friendly relations with the United States as well as fascist Italy. An “entente” 
with Italy, according to Fuller, would be particularly advantageous, as Britain could then 
freely stand apart from any future Franco-German conflict without fearing any threat to 
the Mediterranean or the North Sea.
127
 In another article, he repeated his standard 
arguments against the League of Nations, returning to the concept behind Empire Unity 
and Defense that the British Empire was “the only peaceful league of nations which 
exists.”
128
 Britain should consolidate the empire and rearm, “not because we want to fight 
anyone in particular, but because, as long as the inmates of the European war asylum 
remain criminal lunatics, a bludgeon, though it may not solve a political argument, can 
defend our lives.”
129
 These stray comments represent for the most part little beyond what 
Fuller had already argued for in more detail in Empire Unity and Defense and elsewhere. 
Fuller continued to regard the international situation as a problem for other nations; 
Britain should disengage from its international obligations and focus on the development 
of the empire. Insofar as alliances with other states should be pursued, they should be 
pursued purely with British interests in mind, rather than any altruistic motives. 
Fuller’s most striking comments on the international situation during this period 
were found in his article on “Germany – As I See It,” published in English Review in 
May. While this article contained few explicit policy recommendations, it clearly showed 
the evolution of Fuller’s attitude towards Nazi Germany – and significantly 
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foreshadowed the pro-Nazi stance that Fuller would exhibit with greater force in the 
wake of his disappointing experience of Italian fascism during the Italian-Ethiopian War. 
While Fuller stopped short of the more extreme pro-Nazi sentiments that he later adopted 
(claiming merely to be expressing the opinion of a “considerable yet inarticulate 
minority” of Britons favorably disposed towards the Nazi regime),
130
 he nevertheless 
displayed considerable sympathy for the German dictator and for Nazism generally. He 
also attempted to excuse the brutality of the Nazi regime, downplaying German atrocities 
or defending them as unavoidable in the circumstances. Hitler appeared to Fuller as an 
almost saint-like figure, a man of the people who was “as a spark” to the “inert bits of 
despondent humanity” of the German people.
131
 Hitler had raised Germany from the 
“slough of despond” created by the Treaty of Versailles, “[raising] an entire nation from 
degradation to a sense of dignity.”
132
 Fuller already believed that Hitler was one of the 
greatest figures of the age – “…whatever history may relate of him,” Fuller wrote, 
“[Hitler] will pass down the ages as one of the most remarkable personalities of this 
century.”
133
  
Nazi policy seemed to Fuller to be worthy of admiration, if not necessarily of 
emulation. He discerned two underlying principles of Nazism – the paramount 
importance of the “common weal” over “personal advantage” (“this may be called 
Hitlerism”) and the restoration of Germany’s status as a Great Power.
134
 According to 
Fuller, the first principle had been taken to extreme lengths during the “events of June 30 
last” – the Knight of Long Knives, which was one of the most infamous examples of 
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Nazi barbarity in 1934.
135
 The open violence with which the so-called “Röhm Putsch” 
was repressed had in fact been perfectly justified. “Though possibly and probably Hitler 
realized that a number of innocent people were likely to suffer with the guilty,” Fuller 
explained, “my opinion is that he felt that this was better for the Reich than long drawn-
out trial which would have degraded Germany in her own eyes.”
136
 This was evidently an 
example – “ruthless in its personal application”
137
 – of the principle of common good 
before private gain! As regards Hitler’s bellicose rhetoric, Fuller suggested that this was 
no more than a campaigning tactic: “when Hitler says he stands for peace,” Fuller wrote, 
“we may believe him.”
138
 Fuller’s views as outlined in “Germany – As I See It,” 
however, fall short of endorsing Nazi policy altogether – let alone suggesting that British 
politics should be reorganized along Nazi lines. From his experiences in Germany, Fuller 
concluded that the Nazi state was in danger of “over-organization – the mechanization of 
body and soul.”
139
 If Nazism were to lead to the creation of a rigidly bureaucratic state, 
Fuller declared, “Germany is doomed.”
140
 The lessons that Fuller drew from the German 
example were extremely broad – Hitler’s success merely demonstrated the importance of 
“energetic minorities led by daring individual personalities” in world history.
141
 The 
German model, in fact, did not appear to Fuller to be capable of importation to Britain: 
“…in the conditions which surround us,” Fuller wrote, “there would appear to be little 
room for a man of the type of Hitler…”
142
 Fuller merely suggested that there was room 
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for Hitler’s “faith, energy and single-mindedness” in the British political system – in 
short, room for what Fuller conceived to be the platform offered by the BUF.
143
 
In spite of the clearly positive opinion of Nazi Germany that Fuller expressed in 
his article for the English Review – which stood out as a singular anomaly in his 
journalistic output in 1935 – Fuller’s general attitude on foreign affairs during this period 
may be characterized as cautiously pro-Italian. His views would be put to the test as he 
became increasingly involved with the practical questions of BUF foreign policy as war 
between Italy and Abyssinia loomed in August 1935. An article by Fuller marked the 
beginning of Blackshirt’s antiwar campaign, appearing on August 23 under the headline 
“Britain Must Keep Out of the War.”
144
 Fuller’s article staked out his basic position on 
the developing international crisis. Although presented in forceful and simplistic 
language, his case against intervention in the Italian-Ethiopian conflict drew heavily from 
his established analysis of the “natural history of war.” Italy, according to Fuller, had 
been denied the fulfillment of its rightful territorial ambitions by the Treaty of Versailles. 
Lacking an outlet for its rapidly growing population (Fuller conveniently overlooked 
Italy’s extant colonial holdings in Libya and Eritrea), Italy faced a stark choice between 
territorial expansion and starvation. As starvation could in all probability lead to Italy 
falling to Bolshevism, Italy was forced to accept the conquest of Ethiopia as the “lesser 
evil.”
145
 Moreover, Ethiopia was particularly suited to colonization, being sparsely 
populated and “potentially rich.” The underdeveloped state of Ethiopian society was 
offered as a further justification for Italian aggression: “What is just in Abyssinia,” 
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according to Fuller, “would be classed as sheer brutality in the most backward of our 
colonies.” 
146
 
 Many of the themes that Fuller touched upon in his initial article would be taken 
up and elaborated as the BUF launched its first great antiwar campaign under the slogan 
“Mind Britain’s Business” in September. In the meantime Fuller departed for Germany, 
where he was dispatched as a military correspondent for the Daily Mail. Fuller was the 
sole foreign correspondent to witness the German army maneuvers on Lüneburg 
Heath.
147
 What he saw of the German military confirmed his belief in the basic anti-
modernism of traditional military organizations. Fuller met Field Marshal von Blomberg 
and General Beck, both of whom were staying at his hotel. Although sympathetic to 
mechanization, Beck and von Blomberg, according to Fuller’s later reflection, lacked the 
“violent and revolutionary” interest in military modernism “which alone can jog military 
thought out of its monastic ruts.”
148
 The head of the German army, General von Fritsch, 
struck Fuller as even less capable of grasping the reality of modern warfare: 
Though very Prussian, to me he was peculiarly English, for I sensed that he looked upon 
my humble self as a military Anti-Christ, a kind of mechanical fiend who was out to 
destroy the glory of von Bredow and obscure in smoke and smell the glittering gatherings 
on the hill of Frenois and suchlike things.
149
 
 
Fuller’s analysis in his articles was more forgiving. The German army’s lack of modern 
weaponry was a blessing in disguise for, without the retarding influence of old weapons, 
the German army would be relatively free to embrace the principles of modern warfare. 
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Fuller concluded, therefore, that “the tactical possibilities of the German army are 
overwhelming.”
150
  
 Fuller moreover was extremely impressed by the martial spirit exhibited by 
soldiers and civilians alike, which confirmed his belief in the capacity of fascism to bring 
about a European spiritual revival. As he argued, the important part of the maneuvers was 
not the military action itself – which was, due to the lack of modern weaponry, largely 
anachronistic – but rather “the spirit behind what was done.”
151
 He had nothing but praise 
for the martial fervor displayed by the participants, remarking that “never do I remember 
having seen so keen a delight by soldiers in soldiering, or so keen an appreciation of 
things military as was displayed by these thousands of spectators…”
152
 His conclusion 
was predictable: “In this spirit lies the foundation of German military strength. The rest, 
important thought [sic] it is, is nothing more than common sense.”
153
 This represented 
reaffirmation of Fuller’s belief that the spiritual revival of fascism could overcome 
military conservatism and bring about genuine modernization. What Fuller had seen at 
the German maneuvers appeared to vindicate his embrace of fascism as a means to 
achieve military reform. 
 Fuller’s next journey abroad would take him to Italy and from there to Abyssinia, 
where he would have his first opportunity to see how well a fascist government could 
cope with a real war – something more substantive than well-rehearsed maneuvers. In 
late September, Lord Rothermere appointed Fuller to serve as the Daily Mail 
correspondent to Ethiopia in the event of an Italian invasion. Fuller accepted the 
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assignment which, as Fuller’s articles from the front lines reveal, called upon Fuller to 
engage in a purely military analysis of developments in the war. Fuller was however by 
no means a dispassionate observer. As he indicated in a report written to Lord 
Rothermere after his return, summarizing his experiences in Abyssinia, Fuller understood 
the Daily Mail’s official attitude towards the war to be that “the war is an unwise one, yet 
it is no business of ours, and in the present explosive state of Europe any restrictions 
placed on Italy are dangerous.”
154
 The Daily Mail’s editorial policy was thus firmly 
within the newspaper’s tradition of sympathy and – at times – outright support for Italian 
fascism.  
 Fuller’s own perspective on the war, however, went beyond the tepid non-
interventionism advocated by the Daily Mail. In a letter to Mosley written soon after he 
received his appointment as special correspondent, Fuller asked the BUF leader to send a 
private letter to Mussolini requesting certain special accommodations. Fuller hoped to 
have a private meeting with Mussolini. He hoped moreover to use Mosley’s connections 
to receive preferential treatment, stating that, “as a correspondent, I particularly want to 
get away from the mob of correspondents. What would suit me best would be to be 
attached to G. H. Q., anyhow to start with. As a soldier I shall know how much not to 
repeat.”
155
 As justification for his requested privileges, Fuller noted that “(1) I am a 
trained soldier. (2) I am a full-blooded Fascist.”
156
 Fuller offered the assurance that he 
would be “only too pleased to help his [Mussolini’s] policy.” Sympathy for Mussolini’s 
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fascist regime therefore brought Fuller to the point of supporting Italian aggression 
outright, rather than merely advocating British non-intervention. Fuller believed that his 
reporting could give real support to the Italian cause in Britain: “I think I can be of real 
help to Mussolini as well as to the Daily Mail.”
157
 
 Privately, the journey to Ethiopia represented more to Fuller than merely the 
opportunity to serve either as a war correspondent or as a propagandist. The Ethiopian 
war was Fuller’s first chance to see whether the vigorous military rationalism that he 
attributed to fascism in theory held up in practice. Fuller had expressed his belief earlier 
in the year that “the outlook of Fascism upon war is a commonsense one, for the Fascist 
is a realist.”
158
 The fascist does not simply give in to hysteria: “He is open to examine the 
problem as a physician examines a patient…if the problem is solvable it will be solved 
scientifically, that is by seeking truth, maintaining an impartial mind and working in an 
orderly way.”
159
 It remained to Fuller to see whether real fascists employed as scientific 
and systematic an approach to the problems of war as the ideal fascist of his imagination. 
Fuller thus undertook his mission to Abyssinia with several overlapping intentions: as a 
correspondent, to report on military events as he saw them; as a fascist, to support the 
policies of Mussolini’s government; and as an intellectual and military critic, to test the 
accuracy of his own assertions about the nature of fascism. 
 Fuller departed for Italy on October 3, arriving in Rome on the fourth.
160
 The next 
day his first article on the war appeared in the Daily Mirror under the headline “How I 
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Would Conquer Abyssinia.”
161
 Fuller started his analysis from the proposition that the 
war should be as short as possible as a long war would be exhausting and would 
necessarily weaken Italy relative to other European powers.
162
 Believing that the 
Ethiopian government was held together only tenuously, he advocated the use mobile 
forces to seize the capital as soon as possible. After the occupation of Ethiopia’s political 
center, “my main military problem will be solved; after that it will largely be replaced by 
one of police work and diplomacy.”
163
  
Fuller’s article provides an important guide for understanding how he approached 
and responded to the war in Ethiopia: “How I Would Conquer Abyssinia” represented a 
practical application of the principles of war that Fuller had developed based on his 
experiences in the First World War. It is in effect a blueprint for a “rationally” conducted 
war (what Fuller later called “totalitarian warfare”). Italy’s success or failure in 
implementing this (or a similar) strategy therefore played a crucial role in shaping his 
reaction to continental fascism in general and Italian fascism in particular.  
 The day after arriving in Rome, Fuller called on the Italian Minister of 
Propaganda and received a formal letter of introduction to Mussolini – apparently due to 
Mosley’s intervention on his behalf.
164
 Fuller’s appointment with Mussolini was fixed for 
October 7; he spent much of the intervening two days sightseeing, observing in his diary 
that the people appeared to be very calm in spite of the recently-declared war.
165
 On the 
appointed day, he was met by Count Muiervi, the secretary to the Minister of 
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Propaganda, who accompanied Fuller to Mussolini’s home in the Plazza de Vennezia. 
After waiting for less than five minutes, Fuller was shown into “the great man’s room.”
166
  
 Surprised by the dictator’s short stature, Fuller found “the great man” to be an 
able conversationalist, “as easy to talk to as…Hitler.”
167
 Conversing in French, Mussolini 
first inquired how Fuller intended to get to Abyssinia. Upon hearing that Fuller had some 
concerns about traveling by air, Mussolini immediately called in an official from the 
Colonial Office. Fuller’s passage to the theater of war by Italian troop transport was 
arranged forthwith – an ostentatious and no doubt deliberate display of power. Their 
conversation then turned to the situation in England, which Fuller attempted to explain. 
The Abyssinian crisis, according to Fuller, was “virtually over.” At the worst, the League 
of Nations might impose sanctions on Italy “which were not sanctions at all.” Mussolini 
expressed astonishment at the hostility of the British press towards the Italian invasion of 
Ethiopia, a phenomenon that Fuller ascribed to Jewish influence. Fuller explained his 
view that “behind the political situation was the international situation – the fight 
between the old world v. the new.” According to Fuller, “Jewry dreaded fascism + would 
do its utmost to smash it.” In consequence, Mussolini should seek to end the war as 
quickly as possible “because the weak link in the Italian harness was her staying power.” 
Drawing on the argument that he had outlined in “How I Would Conquer Abyssinia,” 
Fuller further warned that foreign powers would be quick to take advantage of any Italian 
weaknesses revealed over the course of a long war. Mussolini finally inquired into the 
progress of the fascist movement in England, which Fuller explained in full.
168
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 Reflecting on the meeting, Fuller considered Mussolini himself to be impressive – 
“a man of Napoleonic caste.” He and his government were nevertheless not without 
flaws. Fuller believed that Mussolini was ill served by his subordinates “who being 
dominated by his forceful personality are reduced to knock kneed yes men.” These 
subordinates effectively controlled the population in a way that Fuller compared to the 
“doping” effect of artificial stimulants. Fuller speculated that this method of mass control 
might prove problematic for Italy in the long run. While Nazi Germany (in Fuller’s 
estimation) suffered from an excess of government organization, in Italy “the enemy 
seems likely to be a reducing ability to react to artificial stimulation.” In his short stay in 
Italy, Fuller already believed that he could perceive this effect: “Even now in its earliest 
stages, as far as I sense it, by the masses of the people, the war is looked upon as a 
colonial fancy – a private war of Mussolini’s  + not a national affair.”
169
 Privately, 
therefore, Fuller had already begun to have his doubts about the success of Italian fascism 
and the effectiveness of dictatorship. A single dictator – even one of “Napoleonic caste” 
– could be deceived and rendered ineffective by his subordinates. Excessive propaganda-
driven “stimulation” – the manifestations of which Fuller had perhaps considered as part 
of the spiritual revolution of fascism – could fail in its essential purpose if used 
improperly. The disinterested attitude of Italians towards the war, which Fuller had 
divined after only two days in Rome, was evidence that fascism was not always capable 
of fulfilling its promise of mobilizing whole populations for a common cause. 
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 Three days later Fuller set sail for Abyssinia. In his earlier letter to Mosley, Fuller 
had expressed his particular desire to travel for Italy aboard an Italian transport.
170
 This 
would give Fuller an opportunity to observe the Italian army firsthand, “away from the 
mob of correspondents.”
171
 Fuller was immediately struck by the shoddy and unmilitary 
appearance of the troops onboard: “They certainly do not look like our soldiers: their 
clothing fits anyhow and appears shoddy, their carbines are rusty and ill kept; in fact they 
look what I believe them to be – armed colonists.”
172
 He speculated that the men he saw 
were not primarily intended for combat roles, serving instead to follow up the 
professional soldiers and native troops. An English-speaking Italian officer later 
identified the men as Blackshirt Volunteers – political soldiers – many of whom would 
most likely volunteer to remain in the conquered territories after the war.
173
 Fuller 
optimistically concluded that this confirmed his theory that the troops were primarily 
colonists, an illusion that he was unable to sustain in light of his subsequent experience. 
 What Fuller had seen aboard the Italian transport ship proved a fitting prelude for 
what was to come. The Italian army in Ethiopia fell far short of Fuller’s high 
expectations. Rather than a resounding demonstration of the fascist military spirit – the 
rational, disciplined and scientific approach to war that was, for Fuller, one of fascism’s 
chief attractions – the Italian military effort, from the highest levels of planning to the 
lowliest Blackshirt volunteers, amounted to little less than a military travesty. The 
soldiers themselves were motley and ill-disciplined. Having spent a day accompanying a 
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unit of Blackshirts, Fuller devoted one of the lengthiest passages in his diary to a detailed 
deconstruction of the competence and military virtues of the Italians. The troops 
themselves were “a curious collection of men who looked like brigands and enjoyed 
looking like it. Their discipline I should say was nil.”
174
 While they might possibly serve 
some use in a brawl, they struck Fuller as utterly out of place on the battlefield: “They are 
outwardly and inwardly the most unsoldierlike bunch of men I have ever seen 
masquerading as soldiers.”
175
 Their appearance was eccentric. Many wore badges 
depicting lightning flashes or skulls with daggers in their teeth – “it was all very 
melodramatic and unsoldierly[,] a kind of Pirates of Penzance business.” Much of their 
activity seemed intended to express manliness, rather than to serve a particular military 
function. Fuller recorded that a rearguard unit, having completed an exhausting fifteen 
mile march, volunteered to serve as the advance guard the very next day. Their 
commanding officer, impressed by the gesture, at once agreed. The professional soldier 
within Fuller balked. “It was not a question whether an advance guard should be fresh or 
not,” Fuller sighed, “but one of the spirit of Fascism.”
176
  
 The leadership of the men was further cause for dismay. Fuller recounted that the 
unit’s leader, called “General” Mantagua by his men, was “really a Colonel, but is called 
General because his Blackshirts like this title better.” His second in command – a poet in 
civilian life – was also called “General,” having once held the rank of Consul General.
177
 
Fuller could hardly approve of the sort of military in which, as he observed, “an officer is 
made second in command of 4000 men, not because he is a good soldier but [because he 
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is] a Fascist poet.”
178
 The war, he concluded, was “not a demonstration of soldiership but 
of Fascism.”
179
 He was not at all impressed. The absurdity of the situation was manifestly 
comical, yet the Italians behaved with the utmost sincerity and seriousness. This struck 
Fuller as a serious flaw: 
I have noticed this lack of humour from Mussolini downwards. It is the type met with 
among small children. A boy plays at being an engine driver and these people play at 
being soldiers. Everything is done to show what men they are when all the time they are 
children.
180
 
 
Italian incompetence, moreover, was not restricted purely to military affairs. Already, 
Fuller found reason to condemn Mussolini’s form of fascism entirely. The Italians, 
according to Fuller, elevated their leader to the level of a deity: 
The Duce is their god, and the fundamental weakness in the Italian System is that he is 
not immortal. Gods must not die for death reveals them as being pseudo-gods and 
humans – then comes the crash.
181
 
 
Having spent less than a month in the theater of war, Fuller had already concluded that 
Mussolini’s dictatorship was a contributing factor in the incompetence that he observed. 
The entire system was childish and, ultimately, unsustainable. 
 Moreover, the war itself appeared to be fundamentally ill-considered. Assessing 
the general dispersal of Italian forces, Fuller commented that “who ever planned this 
campaign must have been a military lunatic.”
182
 General de Bono, the overall commander 
of the Italian army in Ethiopia, struck Fuller as an effective nonentity. “He did not 
impress me,” Fuller wrote. “Too old. I doubt whether he lasts long.”
183
 Italian planning 
indicated a fundamental lack of understanding of logistics, having “no idea of the 
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proportion between supply and tactical power.”
184
 The invasion was on the whole 
impractical given the limited logistical base. Massana, the port through which much of 
the Italian supplies ultimately passed, appeared to be “totally inadequate for so extensive 
an operation.”
185
 There was simply no way to provide the Italian forces with adequate 
supplies. “The forces in front represent a pumpline on a slender straw,” Fuller wrote. 
“The straw is far too small. This is a European war campaign on small war 
communications.”
186
 An Italian victory, in spite of Italy’s theoretically overwhelming 
superiority, did not appear likely – at least not in the short term. 
 As it happened, Fuller was denied the opportunity to see how things would turn 
out firsthand. Already by mid-November it had become very difficult to report on 
developments on the front lines. In a letter to his mother, Fuller complained that he and 
his fellow journalists were stationed too far from the front to do their jobs effectively. 
“The front is really 200 miles south of us,” he explained, “and it takes so long to get 
there, at least 2 days, that unless we are moved forward, which seems unlikely, I think I 
shall return to England some time next week.”
187
 On November 16, he learned that De 
Bono had been replaced as general in command of Italian operations, Marshal Badoglio 
having been substituted in his place. While good news for the Italians, this change proved 
a bad omen for the war correspondents in Abyssinia. As Fuller recounted in The First of 
the League Wars, Badoglio imposed very tight restrictions on the freedom of the press. 
Journalists were confined to Asmara and were permitted to leave the area only under 
extraordinary circumstances; the use of names of localities, units and individuals in 
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dispatches was expressly forbidden; any reference to troop movements, whether of the 
Italians or Abyssinians, was likewise restricted.
188
 Fuller concluded, not without reason, 
that the restrictions were intended to drive all foreign journalists out of the country.
189
  
 On returning to England in January, Fuller immediately set about analyzing his 
experiences in Italy and Ethiopia. The result of this effort was a lengthy report for the 
Daily Mail on the conduct of the first months of the Italian-Ethiopian War.
190
 The thirty-
nine page report – which has thus far remained unknown – constitutes a synoptic account 
of the Italian military effort in Ethiopia. Fuller offers a description of the origins of the 
conflict and the various events of the campaign, colored by his own personal experiences. 
This account is particularly important because it gives a complete picture of how Fuller’s 
views developed in direct response to his experiences in Ethiopia. The report also sheds 
considerable light on Fuller’s otherwise inexplicable rejection of Italian fascism in 
particular and foreign fascism generally, which was characteristic of the later 
development of his political thought. 
 Fuller’s description of the Italian military campaign throughout his report for the 
Daily Mail is scathing. The Italians had initiated the war having made “the meagerest 
[sic] preparations…for the coming conflict.”
191
 The initial plan for the campaign was 
decided upon according to means that Fuller described as “nothing other than military 
witchcraft.”
192
 The Italian military leadership was ancient and out of step with modern 
developments. The fighting men themselves were useless, being “totally unsuited to the 
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operations which face them.”
193
 Altogether, the Italian force constituted “a comic opera 
army, a huge melodramatic troupe: a gathering of armed men in which each group 
possesses a discipline or lack of discipline of its own.”
194
 This was very far from what 
Fuller had been led to expect; it was certainly not the scientific and rational approach to 
war that Fuller believed was characteristic of fascism.  
 Many of the flaws that Fuller found in the Italian military campaign moreover 
appeared to be symptomatic of Italian Fascism generally. The Italian army’s 
incompetence was not merely a product of poor military leadership – political leadership 
shared much of the blame. “Not only are the Italian forces in Abyssinia not organized for 
war in that country,” Fuller argued, “but they are not organized for war in any country, 
civilized or barbaric.”
195
 The entire war was nothing more than a “political demonstration 
in uniform.” Rather than a “tactical instrument,” the Italian army appeared to Fuller to be 
“grouped together like a Lord Mayor’s show. It contains a bit of everything, not because 
each bit is tactically valuable, but because the whole is politically symbolic of a united 
Fascist Italy. It is, therefore, representative of Italy and not of Italy’s military strength – it 
is in short the chorus of Mussolini and not a fighting instrument.”
196
  
 Fuller’s opinion of Mussolini was, on reflection, no less scathing than his opinion 
of the Italian armed forces. Of his meeting with the Italian leader, Fuller wrote that, 
From common report I had been led to look upon him [Mussolini] as a realist and a 
futurist; but after having spoken with him for a few minutes I was disillusioned. He 
appeared to me to possess neither of these qualities; instead I found him to be an idealist 
and a mythologist. In place of looking forwards he was looking backwards, and instead of 
accepting the world as it is, his whole inclination was obviously directed towards 
recreating the world as it once had been. In fact, he was not an Italian, he was a Roman, 
an avatara who when he looked out on the Mediterranean saw a Roman sea, and when on 
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Africa – a Roman land. France to him was Greece, England Carthage and Germany the 
land of the dread barbarians of the north.
197
 
 
This was not at all what Fuller had hoped to find in the representative of what he 
conceived to be a thoroughly forward-looking and modernizing ideology. Fuller further 
criticized much of Mussolini’s policy throughout his rule. His response to the economic 
crisis was essentially classical in conception: Mussolini had recruited his “superfluous 
Italian manhood” into Blackshirt units, which were “no more than bands of armed 
unemployed.”
198
 This policy led to the growth of bureaucracy “by leaps and bounds until 
the nation was all but throttled.”
199
 Fuller even went so far as to implicitly criticize the 
very concept of autocracy. He described Mussolini as “the most isolated man in Italy,” 
who, being surrounded by “sycophants and yes-men” was in consequence “as cut off 
from reality as a mummy in its sarcophagus, and is in fact little more than a kingly corpse 
wrapped in yards and yards of bureaucratic red-tape.”
200
 
 Given the flawed organization of the Italian state and the Italian army’s 
fundamentally misguided approach to the conflict, Fuller was not sanguine about 
Mussolini’s ability to bring the Ethiopian war to a successful conclusion. While offering 
the prudent reservation that “it is always risky to predict how a war is going to end,” 
Fuller pronounced his judgment that “after having been three months in Eritrea and after 
having spoken to hundreds of people, I can see no silver lining to this one.”
201
 He 
returned to his earlier criticism that Italy’s invasion of Ethiopia was misguided in the 
extreme. “That it was ever launched,” Fuller declared, “seems to me to have been the act 
of a mad man, and as it has been planned and conducted goes more than to accentuate 
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this supposition.”
202
 By invading Ethiopia, Mussolini had bitten off much more than he 
could chew. It was a war not only against Ethiopia, but also “against world opinion as 
concentrated in the League.”
203
 Even more importantly, Fuller added, “it is a war against 
nature.”
204
 Inhospitable conditions in Ethiopia represented a grave threat to the Italian 
forces due to the failure of the Italian leadership to take them sufficiently into account 
and establish an adequate logistical base. The vast Italian force in Ethiopia was left at the 
mercy of the weather and faced, as a result, the possibility of a disaster on an even greater 
scale than that of Adowa. Although Italy still had the chance to salvage the war (by 
bringing her strategy into line with the course that Fuller had proposed in his article on 
“How I Would Conquer Abyssinia”), Fuller feared that it was already too late. “The 
crucial factor which governs this possible new campaign is time,” Fuller suggested. “It 
could scarcely be initiated before the monsoons break, and has Italy the staying power to 
endure a further eighteen months of war? I doubt it…”
205
  
 Italy’s project in Ethiopia was thus faced by the real possibility of failure. The 
consequences of an Italian defeat were liable to be disastrous. Almost any possible 
outcome of an Italian defeat in Ethiopia could very likely lead to a larger and more 
destructive war. As Fuller wrote, “…if my reading of the character of Mussolini is in any 
way right, I feel that, should he be forced by failure, he will become desperate and look 
for any excuse to cover it by precipitating a still greater conflict.”
206
 The consequences 
would be even more terrible – if such a thing were possible – if Britain and the League of 
Nations precipitated an Italian defeat through the imposition of sanctions. Any 
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restrictions imposed on Italian trade would simply provide Mussolini with “the excuse to 
set Europe ablaze.”
207
 Even worse, if the League of Nations went so far as to cut off the 
Italian supply of oil (which Fuller rightly considered an essential resource for the Italian 
war effort), “a greater [war] will of a certainty be started.”
208
 
 Fuller wrapped up his report with a short appendix in which he urged a 
modification of the Daily Mail’s policy on the Italian-Ethiopian War. Summarizing the 
pro-Italian editorial policy of the Daily Mail, Fuller argued that the paper should 
substantially withdraw its support from Mussolini. While the Daily Mail would be well 
advised to support Italian policy in order to prevent Italy from falling to communism 
(which would inevitably follow an Italian defeat in Ethiopia), Fuller stated that “a clear 
distinction should be made between Mussolini and Italy, because this is patently 
Mussolini’s war.”
209
 According to his logic, it followed that, “by degrees, the ‘Daily 
Mail’ should withdraw its support from the former [Mussolini] without abandoning the 
latter [Italy].”
210
 Fuller even went so far as to speculate that “for us a military dictatorship 
will be no worse than a Fascist, and it may be better as it will bring the King to the 
top.”
211
  
 Fuller’s willingness to consider monarchy or military dictatorship preferable to 
fascism underscores the depth of his disillusionment with the Italian government. Direct 
experience with Mussolini’s regime had revealed to Fuller what he conceived to be 
essential flaws in the Italian system: Mussolini’s government was not at all an exemplar 
of the vigorous, rational, anti-democratic modernism that he believed was central to the 
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spirit of fascism. It was natural that Fuller’s negative reaction to Italian fascism would 
have some influence on his view of the BUF. The flaws of the Italian system led him to 
certain unpleasant conclusions about the state of the British fascist movement. The BUF 
was heavily influenced by Mussolini and Italian Fascism. Although BUF “Italophilia” 
was already in decline by the early months of 1936 (Mosley shut down the BUF’s Italian 
offices in response to worsening Italian-British relations in October 1935),
212
 the BUF 
was nevertheless still very firmly within the Italian fascist orbit. Mosley, by his own 
account, continued to enjoy close relations with Mussolini until after his marriage to 
Diana Mitford in Berlin in October 1936.
213
  In view of the BUF’s continued, overt 
orientation towards the unsatisfactory Italian model, Fuller was moved to recommend 
certain fundamental changes in the British fascist program.  
 Fuller’s principle recommendation for the BUF was that the British fascist 
movement should seek to differentiate itself as much as possible from continental fascism 
as a purely British movement – and that it should adapt itself better to British character 
and aspirations. On the surface, this seems not to be an entirely radical departure from his 
previous attitude. Fuller recognized from his earliest participation in the BUF that British 
fascism, in its style and propaganda (if not in its ideological content and purpose), would 
have to be presented in a particularly British guise if it was to have any hope of success. 
“It should be remembered,” Fuller had noted, “that for every one man and woman who 
applaud the words ‘revolution’ and ‘dictatorship’ there are ten who intensely dislike 
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them.”
214
 Fuller’s earlier concern, however, was confined to making fascism appealing 
for a British audience. Fuller did not doubt that the ultimate object of the BUF, once it 
achieved widespread popularity, was still to be revolution and dictatorship. Experience 
with Italian fascism had led Fuller to question even these most basic goals of British 
fascism.  
 In early February, a few weeks after finishing his report for the Daily Mail, Fuller 
wrote to Mosley arguing that the British fascist movement should substantially change its 
course. “In my opinion,” Fuller wrote, “two things in the Movement are vital: (1) A 
Gospel or New Testament which is British; (2) A simple, stable and permanent 
organization.”
215
 Regarding the first, “foreign elements must be cut out, + in the second 
all possible bureaucracy.”
216
 Foreign influences, in Fuller’s opinion, constituted an 
essential – and potentially fatal – weakness for the BUF: 
From what I have seen in Italy + Germany, Fascism, as expressed in those countries, will not fit 
the English. Both Hitler + Mussolini are riding for a fall. They may get up; but we do not want to 
fall with them; because we may never be able to get up again.
217
 
 
In consequence, Fuller argued that the BUF should adopt significantly different 
objectives, abandoning the movement’s previous goal of instituting an Italian-style fascist 
dictatorship. 
As far as I see the problem [Fuller wrote], we want: 
(1) Not dictatorship, but business at the top, that is power of direction + power to decide things 
quickly + we instinctively do not like one-man control. 
(2) Not a bureaucratic Corporate State, but a democratic one. Planning from the bottom by the 
Corporations for the Corporations. 
(3) Not the regulation of culture, but its free expression. Freedom is the goal + must be the goal, 
+ (1) + (2) are simply the mechanism to produce it.
218
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Fuller further elaborated his criticism of dictatorship, arguing that the goal of establishing 
personal, authoritarian rule was misguided not merely because of British trepidation 
about “one-man control.” As he explained, “dictatorship is really too easy: it looks like a 
short cut; but for this country it is a blind lane. Transformation is the secret… and things 
must be transformed within the conditions which surround them, + they vary in each 
country.” Thus British Fascism must adapt itself more completely – not merely in its 
outward form and message, but in its fundamental ideology – to its social and political 
context. “We are not Italians, we are not Germans, we are British – this is the 
fundamental fact to guide us.”
219
 
Fuller’s recommendations were certainly radical. He essentially advocated a 
complete restructuring of the party’s program. He was too much of a realist to believe 
that these changes would be accepted by the membership of the BUF without resistance. 
“I do not think that these ideas are popular with many on your Staff,” Fuller admitted, 
“but I am certain they are right.”
220
 He was furthermore moved – not entirely 
coincidentally – to minimize his involvement in BUF administration. He suggested to 
Mosley that he should be replaced, “anyhow for the time being,” as Chairman of “B.U.F. 
Publications Ltd.,” and of “Blackshirt Ltd.”
221
 His future, he suggested, was too uncertain 
to allow him to continue to take such an active role. Both organizations needed leaders 
capable of devoting themselves to their work wholeheartedly. Fuller also could not resist 
the temptation to express his displeasure that his attempted reorganization of the BUF 
had thus far brought about very few tangible results. “Last year,” he wrote, “I got you the 
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draft of “B.U.F. Regulations, and so far as I know nothing has happened as regards 
them.”
222
  
This letter, together with his report for the Daily Mail, offers further evidence of 
the extent of Fuller’s frustration with fascism. What he had seen abroad was not all it was 
cracked up to be. The movement at home was organized in imitation of a flawed model, 
and seemed not to be amenable to reform. There appeared to be little hope that Fuller’s 
radical recommendations would be acted upon. Fuller did not quite sever his connection 
to the BUF altogether, but by resigning from his official leadership role he reduced his 
active participation – at least for a time – to a minimum. Due to the loss of almost all of 
Mosley’s correspondence with Fuller, Mosley’s reply is unknowable. Changes in the 
direction of BUF policy throughout 1936, however, suggest that at the very least 
Mosley’s thinking paralleled Fuller’s, even if he was not influenced by Fuller’s 
suggestions outright. Perhaps the most notable change was in the very name of the 
movement itself. In the summer of 1936, the BUF was rechristened the “British Union of 
Fascists and National Socialists.”
223
 Although the word “fascism” was preserved in the 
name of the movement, as Colin Cross explains, “the new title was rarely used in full and 
for practical purposes the Movement became known as ‘British Union’.”
224
  The term 
“National Socialism” for the most part replaced “Fascism” in the organization’s literary 
output. According to Cross, “‘National Socialism’ was an easier term to explain than 
‘Fascism’ and might be expected to have an appeal to the left. ‘British Union’ was a 
simple, patriotic title.”
225
 This change may therefore be considered a very high profile 
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attempt on the part of Mosley’s organization to distance itself from the “foreign 
elements” that Fuller decried. It seems likely that Fuller played some role in bringing this 
about. 
In the time since Fuller’s return, the Italian military campaign in Ethiopia had 
continued apace. Fuller maintained a lively interest in the course of the Italian invasion, 
writing further commentary for the Daily Mail. His pessimism in the early months of 
1936 was reflected in an article in which he argued that Britain should withdraw its naval 
presence in the Mediterranean – apparently based on his fears that Mussolini would strike 
out in Europe if defeated in Ethiopia. Fuller’s concerns over an Anglo-Italian conflict, 
however, rapidly melted away along with his belief in the likelihood of an Italian defeat, 
as it became clear that Italy had adopted a dramatically more effective strategy. Already 
by mid-February, Fuller’s faith in the Italian campaign had recovered sufficiently that he 
speculated that the Italians might bring the war to a rapid close with one decisive blow.
226
 
A string of Italian victories in March offered further cause for optimism. On April 4, 
Fuller confidently pronounced that he would be “in no way surprised if this war ended 
before the monsoons break in June.”
227
  
The revival of Italy’s fortunes in the face of what had seemed in January to be 
insurmountable odds demanded some explanation. Fuller was convinced that he could 
perceive the first tentative steps of a new form of warfare – what he would later term 
“totalitarian warfare.” “The Italian High Command,” Fuller wrote, “has had the vision 
and the courage to develop a new technique of war from the weapons and appliances 
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which science and industry have placed at their disposal.”
228
 In sharp contrast with the 
old method – the traditional technique, reliant on massed infantry, which had achieved its 
tragic consummation in the trenches of the First World War, (“a ding-dong infantry 
clinch, slaughter, demoralization, and then a pursuit by horse and foot…”)
229
 – the 
Italians had, in a flash of inspiration, seized upon the latest weapons that modern science 
could provide. They employed the newest technology vigorously and remorselessly. 
What resulted was a military spectacle that called forth Fuller’s dizzying rhetorical 
acclamation: “Down this defile comes thundering the pursuit; bombers, fighters, followed 
on the ground by men on foot as fast as their legs can move them, and fed, like the 
Israelites of old, from the skies.”
230
 The Italians were at last waging war in a way that 
Fuller considered to be both scientific and rational – and intensely modern: “They have 
realized how, scientifically, to combine pack-animal, lorry, and aeroplane.”
231
  
Fuller’s prediction that the war would end before June proved accurate. Italian 
mechanized columns under the leadership of Marshall Badoglio occupied Addis Ababa 
triumphantly on May 5, bringing the war effectively to a close.
232
 Fuller was quick to 
explain the military lessons of the Italian victory in fascist terms. In Action, Fuller 
published a lengthy article on May 7 titled “Lessons from Ethiopia: Collective Insanity.” 
The Italian victory, achieved through the vigorous use of the latest weaponry – 
particularly airpower and motorized infantry – proved the argument that Fuller had 
originally put forward the year before in his article on “Fascism and War.” Fascist Italy 
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had approached the Ethiopian war with a spirit of decisiveness and determination 
impossible in democratic states. “The world to-day is politically divided into two groups 
of people – the talkers and the doers,” Fuller wrote. “The first represent the democratic 
nations…and the second, the Fascist.”
233
 As he explained, “When Mussolini goes to war 
he does so whole-heartedly, and he selects his leading soldier to lead his men.”
234
 The 
Italian approach to war was a logical outgrowth of fascist politics. “Because the Fascist 
Government is a scientific political instrument,” he argued, “it logically follows that the 
Fascist Army is a scientific military instrument.”
235
 This was of course a striking contrast 
with the approach to war characteristic of democratic states. In the First World War, 
according to Fuller, “the technique of war followed the technique of democracy – of 
massed numbers of men. The bullet replaces the ballot and man-power becomes the one 
and all-absorbing problem.”
236
 Thus just as massed infantry was, in his conception, “the 
military expression of democracy,” it seemed that the airpower and rapid motorized 
advances that the Italians had employed so effectively in Ethiopia were the military 
expression both of modernity and of fascism – that is to say, for him, effectively the same 
thing.
237
 The lessons that he drew from the experience of the war were twofold. In the 
first place, Britain and the League of Nations could no longer hope to achieve real results 
through the application of sanctions. The war in Ethiopia had proved decisively that a 
fascist state might, through the use of modern military technology, achieve victory long 
before sanctions could have a chance to take hold. The second lesson, which Fuller 
suggested less overtly, was that Britain herself should pursue military modernization 
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along fascist lines. “What are we preparing for?” Fuller asked. “A war of scientific 
weapons? No! Instead a war of democratic saurian contests: massed struggles, massed 
slaughterings, and massed destruction; in three words – 1914 all over again!”
238
 This was 
nothing less than insanity “for, tactically speaking, in the next war we shall find that we 
have applied military sanctions against ourselves.”
239
 
 
V. “TOTALITARIAN WARFARE” 
 By the summer of 1936, Fuller had begun to elaborate in more explicit terms the 
concept of “totalitarian warfare,” which would dominate much of his foreign policy 
analysis throughout the remainder of the decade – a concept which grew out of (and 
contributed to) his developing political views. “Totalitarian warfare” was in effect a 
synthesis of Fuller’s military and political thought. Its seeds had already been sown in 
much of Fuller’s earlier military writing. His championing of the latest military 
technology – the effect of which would be, in Fuller’s estimation, an escalation both of 
the pace and the (short-term) destructiveness of war – led him gradually to the conclusion 
that modern democratic states were particularly vulnerable to the new, faster pace of 
warfare. A nation could be overwhelmed and defeated by modern arms in the space of a 
few days or weeks (as France and Poland would be in 1939-40). It therefore appeared to 
Fuller to be imperative that nations adopt a posture of absolute readiness for war, if they 
were to have any chance to repel such an assault; the swift, decisive mechanized attack, 
which Fuller described (without negative connation) as “totalitarian,” necessitated the 
total mobilization of national populations – in effect, the totalitarian organization of the 
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fascist state. The astonishing speed with which Italy was able to turn what had seemed to 
Fuller – as recently as January – to be imminent defeat into absolute victory, through the 
application of modern military methods, underscored the political consequences of 
“scientific” warfare. He began to speculate that such methods might be employed 
effectively not only against the relatively ill-equipped armies fielded by Ethiopia but even 
against the best defended nations in the world – not in the distant future, but in the 
present day.  
On May 10, Fuller’s first explicit discussion of “totalitarian warfare” appeared in 
print in the Sunday Dispatch under the headline, “Europe’s Next War will be the Spring 
of a Tiger: Over in Four Weeks – or Even Four Hours.” The new type of warfare brought 
about by modern technology would bear little relation to that which predominated during 
the Great War. “This type of conflict,” Fuller declared, “must be forgotten; for the next 
great war will be based on a very different philosophy, namely, that of ‘Totalitarian 
Warfare.’”
240
 In the new type of war, the first glimmerings of which had appeared during 
the Italian campaign in Ethiopia, “there will be no challenge, no mobilization, simply the 
spring of a tiger.”
241
  Militaries that simultaneously employed a large air force and an 
“immensely powerful and, above all, mobile mechanized and motorized land force” 
would be able to end wars on a much faster time scale than was previously possible. 
Turning to Germany, Fuller declared that Hitler had created just such a military. If Hitler 
went to war, Fuller argued, the results would be entirely different than they were in 1914-
18: “Never does [Germany] intend to fight such a war again; for its end must mean 
Bolshevism. If she has to fight she will win or lose not in four exhausting years but in 
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four weeks, four days – possibly four hours.”
242
 Sanctions, the preferred weapon of the 
League of Nations, would have no opportunity to take effect in such a short timeframe. 
Fuller thus heavily suggested that Britain should discard sanctions and prepare for 
“totalitarian warfare,” accepting its radical implication that “civil life is merged into war 
preparedness.”
243
 Only a fascist state, Fuller implicitly suggested, could withstand the 
force and violence of totalitarian war. But while Fuller believed that Germany would be 
capable of waging totalitarian war, he was quick to deny that Hitler intended to do so: 
“…personally I believe Hitler to be a man of peace.”
244
 
Fuller’s references to Hitler hint at another shift in his thought, which ran parallel 
to his newly articulated concept of “totalitarian warfare.” Nazi Germany began to appear 
to Fuller as the example par excellence of the successful implementation of fascism. 
Although Mussolini and Italy had been redeemed to some extent by their remarkable 
success in Ethiopia, Fuller was unable wholly to overlook the very obvious political and 
military flaws that he had witnessed firsthand. He admired the Italians for their victory in 
Ethiopia, but his confidence in Mussolini’s regime was irrevocably damaged. Yet 
although Fuller had seemed in early 1936 to be on the verge of renouncing fascism even 
in Britain, he nevertheless retained considerable faith in what he called the “new world 
conception.” The flaws of one fascist state were insufficient to challenge Fuller’s belief 
that fascism was the political expression appropriate to modernity, which was one of his 
most deeply-held convictions. Disappointed with Italian fascism, Fuller slid easily into 
enthusiastic support for Nazi Germany. 
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These major shifts in Fuller’s thought found their full expression in The First of 
the League Wars: Its Lessons and Omens – one of the two books he published in 1936. 
Brian Holden Reid described The First of the League Wars as “the most ideologically 
committed of all of [Fuller’s] books.”
245
 The work is unique for its many overtly positive 
references to fascist ideology; Fuller’s other books from the 1930s are in fact remarkable 
for their scrupulous avoidance of any explicit praise for fascism as such. Fuller’s specific 
references to Mosley’s movement in particular in most of his books are few and far 
between. Even in his journalism, Fuller almost never identified himself explicitly with 
fascism when writing for non-fascist publications. In The First of the League Wars, 
however, Fuller went so far as to openly advocate fascist government for Britain. Yet this 
is only the most flagrant example of the fascist undertones that pervade almost every 
page of the work not devoted exclusively to military analysis. The First of the League 
Wars is in fact the definitive statement of Fuller’s thought as it had developed during his 
fascist decade – and probably the most complete, honest statement of his personal 
philosophy that he ever put forward. It is for this reason that it must form a central part of 
an analysis of Fuller’s participation in the British fascist movement. 
A large portion of The First of the League Wars is devoted to the Italo-Ethiopian 
War itself. Fuller’s account of the conflict reconciled his earlier doubts about the Italian 
military with his admiration for its ultimate success in Ethiopia. Many of the criticisms 
that Fuller had voiced in his report for the Daily Mail were repeated, albeit less 
forcefully. Italy had gone to war with a cautious strategy that substituted political 
demonstration for military action and with an army “in few ways fashioned for 
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totalitarian war.”
246
 The Italian military leadership was mired in what Fuller called the 
“Clausewitz epoch.” Their approach to war was fundamentally backward looking, and so 
doomed to failure. They were, in Fuller’s expression, “the alchemists of a past form of 
war instead of…the technicians of a new.”
247
 The troops themselves were un-soldierly 
and ill-disciplined – the army little more than “a Fascist demonstration; a gathering of 
men in which each group possessed a discipline or lack of discipline of its own.”
248
 Yet 
in the aftermath Ethiopia’s defeat, the Italian army’s deficit of military virtue appeared to 
Fuller in a new aspect. The unmilitary bearing of the soldiers, rather than a fault, seemed 
to be evidence of the vital spirit of fascism. “…In spite of all its crudeness,” Fuller wrote, 
“this Army of the Exodus which crossed the Red Sea in search of the Promised Land bore 
along with it the ark of a new military covenant. It was more than a patriotic horde, it was 
the embryo of a machine which breathed forth all the fierceness of dictatorship – a 
political Juggernaut in being.”
249
 But how did the Italian leadership ultimately succeed in 
using its “patriotic horde” to such good effect? According to Fuller, Mussolini and his 
generals simply “stumbled” upon totalitarian strategy and tactics. The decision of the 
League of Nations to impose sanctions on oil forced Mussolini to take decisive action. 
“Like a man with his back to the wall,” Fuller explained, “he was now compelled, not 
only to fight for Abyssinia, but for Italy, for Fascism, for his political life. What was the 
result? From the Italian point of view, the war forthwith was transformed into a Jehad, a 
holy war, a war for national preservation.”
250
 The relentless campaign that ensued, in 
which Mussolini threw every weapon at his disposal into the fight against Ethiopia, was 
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therefore simply a happy accident. Italy’s astonishing success appeared to have been 
achieved in spite of – rather than because of – the Italian political and military leadership. 
Yet the new form of warfare that Italy had demonstrated had “come to stay.”
251
 
“Totalitarian tactics” greatly favored the offensive. It seemed likely, therefore, that the 
aggressor in a future war would be strongly tempted to employ them. In fact, Fuller 
argued, “in another European war, because all nations will be very similarly armed, 
should the aggressor be an isolated nation, that is one encircled by potentially hostile air 
power, then it will be suicidal for its Government not to use surprise in its most ruthless 
form.”
252
 The substance of “totalitarian warfare” itself, as Fuller explained it, was a 
natural outgrowth of his earlier military thought. The leading tactical idea of “totalitarian 
war” was “to strike at the civil will.”
253
 The military objective was no longer the 
destruction of the physical bodies of the enemy’s soldiers, but the psychological 
destruction of the will – not only of the enemy’s armed forces – but of their entire nation. 
This psychological attack, moreover, would not be gradually developed over the course 
of years, as the Entente had effectively destroyed Germany’s will to fight through the 
enforcement of the blockade during the four years of the First World War. Rather, 
“totalitarian war” must “take the form of a coup d’etat: a conspiracy instead of a 
mobilization, and a bolt from the blue of a cloudless sky instead of a declaration preceded 
by political thunder.”
254
 According to Fuller, “Surprise is the essential.”
255
 The purpose 
of the assault upon the enemy’s will would not be the Clausewitzian objective of 
“[imposing] will upon will; for the acceptance of one will by another is a rational act 
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which induces rational reaction.”
256
 Rather, “totalitarian warfare” would simply aim to 
terrorize populations into preferring peace to war.  
The political consequences of “totalitarian warfare” were drastic. The new form 
of warfare appeared to Fuller to be a powerful argument for the urgent necessity of 
fascism. If “totalitarian tactics” had been so effective in Ethiopia, a relatively 
decentralized state by European standards, how much more effective would they be in 
wars between modern western nations? “The nearer belligerents coincide in striking 
power,” Fuller argued, “the more vital will surprise become. So vital, that a time is 
approaching when the first blow may be the last. In other words, while the war of 1914-
18 consisted in a series of long-drawn-out inconclusive encounters, the next may possibly 
consist in one assault lasting but a few hours.”
257
 In such a struggle, in which the instant 
shock of the attack on the civilian population would be tremendous, states with greater 
“national discipline” would have the advantage. In a hypothetical war between France 
and Germany, for example, France would very likely be thrown into a panic by a sudden 
attack. Germany, on the other hand, “on account of the national discipline of her people, 
drilled into military unity by radio propaganda, panic in all probability will be avoided 
and time gained for her government to act in.”
258
 Germany, in other words, would be 
better able to withstand the new violence of “totalitarian warfare” because of the 
totalitarian organization of the Nazi state. Western democracies would therefore be 
compelled to adapt their political organization to the new military reality.259  
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This was a lesson that the democracies would do well to learn before it was too 
late. Britain along with the other western powers should embrace totalitarian politics, as 
the national discipline that totalitarianism would bring would provide the only possible 
security against the shock of the new form of warfare. “Instead of anathematizing,” Fuller 
wrote, “[the democracies] should learn from their totalitarian opponents; for though their 
system of politics appears outwardly to be the apotheosis of force, within it palpitates a 
new spirituality – the control of human instincts and their compulsion under will to 
assume disciplined form.”
260
 This was the crux of Fuller’s new argument for fascism: 
totalitarian government was simply a military necessity. Moreover, totalitarianism was 
necessary not merely for the “spiritual” strength it would provide in the face of an attack 
against the civil will. Totalitarian government implied scientific government. “As warfare 
to-day is based upon science,” Fuller explained, “not only must fighting forces become 
more and more scientific, but the scientific method must be applied to an entire nation, so 
that every man, woman, and child can be fashioned into an enormous catapult which will 
hurl war upon the enemy.”
261
 Totalitarianism would thus be nothing less than the 
application of the scientific method to politics. That Britain would see the wisdom of this 
argument in time, Fuller was less certain. “It is true that we are not a revolutionary or a 
warlike nation,” he admitted, “and it is true that in the hearts of our people there is a 
genuine hatred and fear of national and international turmoils.”
262
 Nevertheless, there 
appeared to Fuller to be some hope that the British would come to embrace the “proper” 
form of totalitarianism.263 
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 Fuller did not content himself merely with describing how the reality of modern 
military technology necessitated totalitarian government. He situated his analysis of the 
influence of “totalitarian warfare” on politics within an elaborated and politically charged 
account of the “natural history of warfare.” To some extent this account was simply a 
restatement of ideas that Fuller had already discussed at length in The Dragon’s Teeth 
and War and Western Civilization. There are nevertheless important differences in the 
“natural history of warfare” as described in The First of the League Wars, which reflect 
the evolution of Fuller’s thought since 1932-33. As before, Fuller’s analysis took the 
form of a highly idiosyncratic kind of historical materialism. According to Fuller, the 
history of Christendom (i.e., western civilization) can be divided into two epochs, a 
religious period and a mechanistic period. Both epochs were characterized by the urge for 
conquest – the religious period by the conquest of souls, the mechanistic period by the 
conquest of things.
264
 It is the latter period which occupies the bulk of Fuller’s attention 
in The First of the League Wars. As he explained, the emergence of conscript armies 
since the time of the French Revolution was an essential ingredient in the development of 
mass democracy.
265
 The French Revolution itself “was more an adaption to the 
conditions created by industrial needs than [a revolution] arising out of political 
motives.”
266
 The consequence of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic Wars which 
followed was the triumph of what Fuller called the “international system of usury” – a 
concept of great importance in fascist ideology which had been entirely missing from 
Fuller’s earlier analysis of the “natural history of war.”
267
 The new system of 
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international finance enabled the transformation of Western Europe “from an agricultural 
to an industrial civilization.”
268
 This transformation inaugurated a new epoch of war, 
which was characterized, according to Fuller, by the dominance of “horde armies” which 
would “kill off or quiet refractory wage-slaves, and put untold wealth into the pockets of 
the industrialists and financiers.”
269
  
The new condition of industrial modernity that the financiers had helped to create 
in turn laid the foundation for alternative forms of civilization. On the one hand there was 
communism, which brought to its fullest extent the egalitarian ideal of the French 
Revolution, promising vengeance to the “outcast drift of dehumanized men and women,” 
the “backwash of the machines” of industrial civilization.
270
 According to Fuller, the 
Marxist concept of class struggle was an adaptation of the Darwinian notion of “survival 
of the fittest” to suit the needs of this oppressed class: “…as the doctrine of survival of 
the fittest seemed to explain the dominance of the new industrial bourgeoisie, a class 
without culture of compassion,” Fuller wrote, “Marx…seizing upon this principle, 
extracted by Darwin from the animal world, extended it to human society in the form of 
the class struggle.”
271
 Fearing the power of Marxist ideology, which seemed the prelude 
to the destruction of their power, the ruling classes attempted to quiet the workers with 
“humanitarianism, out of which emanated a pink protoplasmic substance called 
‘Socialism’; a kind of political hermaphrodite which stands half-way between man as a 
bloodthirsty ape and man as a psalm-singing angel.”
272
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But socialist humanitarianism was unable to remove the menace of communism 
altogether. In Russia, Lenin succeeded in establishing a communist government, what 
Fuller called “the Apotheosis of the Marxian Revolution.” This was, to Fuller, effectively 
inseparable from the triumph of Judaism. Whereas Fuller’s earlier analysis of the 
emergence of the Soviet Union had certainly been colored by anti-Semitic prejudice 
(which was not uncommon in contemporary British accounts of the Soviet Union), the 
paramount importance that anti-Semitism assumes in Fuller’s discussion of the “natural 
history of war” in The First of the League Wars was something new altogether. In 
Fuller’s conception, the triumph of communism was nothing less than the product of a 
Jewish conspiracy. As he wrote, “Now it is beyond dispute that, under the directive 
energy of Lenin, it was the Jews who established Bolshevism in Russia…”
273
 And to 
what purpose? According to Fuller, the Jews “turned the social order upside down in 
order to create chaos, so that the spirit of Judaism might move ‘upon the face of the 
waters,’ and create a Jewish cosmos.”
274
 The extent of Fuller’s descent into conspiratorial 
anti-Semitism is underscored by his citation of the notorious Protocols of the Learned 
Elders of Zion – which since 1920 was well-known to be a forgery – as evidence of this 
putative Jewish plot. “The whole process of this destruction and re-creation is elaborated 
in the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion,” Fuller explained.
275
 Even as he 
acknowledged that the above work had been revealed to be a forgery, Fuller suggested in 
a footnote that this was immaterial. “What of that?” Fuller asked, “If a forger can cash in, 
as the Jews have cashed in on Russia, whether the cheque is genuine or forged the victim 
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experiences an identical discomfort.”
276
 At any rate, he contended himself with citing the 
letter from Buruch Levy to Karl Marx, which had been published in La Revue de Paris in 
1928 – and which was also well-known as an anti-Semitic fabrication – as evidence of 
the malevolent Jewish conspiracy that lay behind communism. That letter revealed, 
according to Fuller, the real purpose of “Marxian materialistic dialectics,” which was “to 
capture and then capitalize the machine by means of the class war, the spirit of which was 
hatred and therefore anti-Christian.”
277
 Fuller concluded his discussion of the Bolshevik 
menace on a hysterical rhetorical pitch, invoking the ancient anti-Semitic trope of the 
Jewish murder of Christ: 
Bolshevism is the last phase of the first crucifixion [Fuller wrote] and the first phase of 
the second; for, as in the first Christ was slain to appease the jealousy of Jehovah; so in 
this second is Christian culture to be destroyed in order that the spirit of Judaism may 
move over the formless and the void and establish its messianic empire. Such, then, is the 
Marxian revolution.
278
 
 
 In contrast to the existential threat posed by communism and Judaism (which he 
blithely conflated), Fuller discovered in fascism the only assurance of security and hope 
for mankind. Fascism, like communism, was an outgrowth of the new conditions created 
by industrial civilization. In particular, just as the earliest industrial developments related 
to steam power favored the “quantity” inherent to mass democracy and communism, the 
new development of the sciences of “life” (physiology, biology, bacteriology, 
psychology, and sociology), together with the chemical and electrical sciences favored 
the “quality” expressed by fascism.
279
 And this was not merely the “quality of things,” 
but rather “quality of human actions and the understanding of the qualities of the human 
                                                 
276
 Ibid., 133. 
277
 Ibid., 134. 
278
 Ibid., 138. 
279
 Ibid., 129. 
 71 
mind and soul.”
280
 Fascism and National Socialism, in fact, had their origin in this 
scientific revolution; their roots ran deep “into the scientific developments of the 
nineteenth century, and are to be discovered more particularly in the revolt of, what may 
be called, the organic sciences against the conditions established by Financial 
Democracy, and not so much in that of the inorganic sciences (coal, steam, iron, 
mechanics) against those fostered by Industrial Democracy.”
281
 The changes wrought by 
the latest developments of science and technology would before long necessitate a new 
economic and political order. “As society was changed by intellectualized science,” 
Fuller explained, “it followed that a time would come when, not only the economic but 
the political system would have to follow suit.”
282
 
The event that made possible the emergence of the “new politics” of autocracy, 
truth, impartiality and order was, of course, the First World War – the consummation of 
the epoch of war and the logical consequence of the dependence of international finance 
on the use of “horde armies.” Although, as Fuller explained, “in the minds of the 
democratic majorities, this war was fought to make the world safe for democracy, 
occultly it was fought to liberate a rising scientific civilization from the dead weight of 
democratic inertia.”
283
 The First World War had been a struggle between the forces of 
science and the forces of reaction, a conflict between the “scientific method and the 
natural evolutionary method of trial and error leading to blind and compulsory change: of 
thought against tradition and of reality against myth.”
284
 During the war, developments in 
military technology had revealed the new political tendency of scientific thought: 
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“eventually… science took autocratic control; aeroplanes, tanks, lethal gas, and a host of 
scientific appliances proving beyond doubt that God no longer sides with the bigger 
battalions, but with the more cunning brains.”
285
 As science and technology had 
demonstrated, during the First World War, that leadership should fall to the minority with 
the “more cunning brains” – essentially a technocratic elite – the emergence of a political 
expression appropriate to this new reality became inevitable. The result was the birth of 
Fascism and National Socialism, political movements that Fuller described, drawing on 
analysis of Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West, as “‘pseudomorphs’: that is, realities 
working in and trying to cast off the myths which encumber them.”
286
 The “myths” to 
which Fuller referred, naturally, were those of liberalism and mass democracy. 
 But what exactly was this new political form, which would harmonize 
government with the reality of modern science? In The First of the League Wars, Fuller 
went into considerable detail in his description of so-called “scientific government.” The 
object of government was, according to Fuller, “to establish order in the relationships 
between men, or, in other words... [to maintain] peace within nations and between 
nations.”
287
 This would mean necessarily government by minority, for majorities were by 
their very nature unfit for rule. “There is no fixed rule in government,” he wrote, “except 
that authority can never reside in the greater number, only in quality of mind, which by 
nature belongs to the lesser number – the minority of the people.”
288
 But to achieve true 
minority rule was an exceedingly difficult task. The great challenge of the day, Fuller 
explained, was “to find wisdom, which takes into consideration the fact that majorities 
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are predominantly irrational.”
289
 To achieve this, Fuller suggested rather obscurely that 
reason “must be fortified, not by unreason but by super-reason – something which both 
the reasoning and unreasoning automatically accept, because it stands beyond 
argument.”
290
 What that would mean in practice was that political power should be 
supported by a kind of secular religiosity: as he wrote, “a government to be stable must 
be possessed of a religious spirit, a belief in its own righteousness, and a sense of self-
sacrifice which compels it to place faith in itself above all desires for peace or war.”
291
 
Although such an end appeared almost impossible, Fuller suggested that certain political 
developments since 1918 were evidence that a government with “super-rational” force 
might be created. “I see it crudely springing up in Russia, Italy, and Germany,” he wrote. 
“In these countries and others politics have been spiritualized in varying degrees, and all 
systems which are spiritualized are in essence super-rational, for they are endowed with a 
wonder which magnetizes the thinking and the unthinking.”
292
 The countries which best 
exhibited the new spiritualized and “super-rational” politics were for Fuller, naturally, the 
fascist states. Communism suffered from the inherent flaw that class antagonism was its 
very “life blood.” For fascism, on the other hand, class struggle was “its deadliest 
disease.”
293
  
 The instrument through which fascism achieved this creative goal of remaking 
society for the common good was the “corporate state” – what Fuller termed the 
“Threefold State.” This notion harkened back to Fuller’s abortive attempt to distill the art 
of war into a scientific discipline in The Foundations of the Science of War (1926). In 
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that work, he had argued that a “threefold order” was the underlying basis of military 
thought. This pseudo-mystical concept seems to have been one of Fuller’s pet notions. In 
a negative review of The Foundations of the Science of War, Brigadier General J. E. 
Edmonds had mocked Fuller’s obsession with the “threefold order,” writing that, as 
Fuller believed that we conceived of nature as “earth, water and air, and mankind as men, 
women and children…besides we might add, wearing ‘coat trousers and boots’ and using 
‘knife, fork and spoon.’”
294
  Despite its negative reception, however, Fuller returned to 
the “threefold order,” applying the dubious concept in this case to political science. 
Human government should be “threefold” because man, in Fuller’s mystical conception, 
was “psychologically threefold,” being simultaneously irrational, rational and super-
rational.
295
 Only a government which was organized to recognize this threefold division 
and to reconcile it could achieve true stability. What exactly the “Threefold State” would 
entail in practice is illustrated by Fuller’s invocation of the historical organization of 
British society.  
For centuries, and more especially so during the feudal age, our system of government 
was threefold and markedly what to-day would be called Fascist. Under the direction of 
the King the people were governed by a threefold instrument: the Lords Spiritual, the 
Lords Temporal, and the Commons. In other words, by a Cultural Chamber, a Political 
Chamber, and an Economic Chamber, which a little later on I will show are the 
constituent parts of the Corporate State.
296
 
 
The “corporate state” as envisioned by Mosley’s movement was therefore the ideal 
government for Britain, being based upon sound rational and scientific principles while 
simultaneously providing the near-religious spiritualism necessary to “magnetize” the 
masses. The “corporate state” would moreover provide Britain with the only true defense 
against the shock of modern “totalitarian warfare”; only a government with the national 
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discipline and integration promised by the “corporate state” could withstand an assault 
directed against the civil will. Fuller’s discussion of the “corporate state” is itself not 
particularly original, being for the most part a recapitulation of ideas that Mosley and 
other members of the BUF (particularly Alexander Raven Thomson) had adapted from 
Italian fascism. The discussion of the “corporate state” in The First of the League Wars is 
most notable for Fuller’s attempt to explain the British Union program in his own 
mystical terms.  Fuller apparently believed that the political program proposed by 
Mosley’s movement would provide the answer to man’s spiritual and material needs. The 
neat way in which Fuller integrated his military and mystical thought with this particular 
political philosophy sheds considerable light on his decision to embrace fascism. Fascism 
represented to Fuller the consummation of the philosophy that he had developed over the 
course of his life. 
 Although Mosley’s movement seemed very far from power in 1936, Fuller was 
sanguine about its chances of success in the long term. The key for Fuller was that British 
fascism take on a particularly British form – an idea that recalls his earlier 
recommendation to Mosley that “foreign elements” be excised from the BUF. This would 
be relatively easy to achieve for, as he argued, fascism was in a real sense a “universal” 
creed. Although fascism took on a national form in different nations, “by selecting the 
common good as its object it is also a potential universal movement.”
297
 British fascism 
did not have to be an exact duplicate of the continental movements that Fuller had found 
disappointing. Although British fascism resembled the flawed Italian form of fascism in 
particular, this was only on the level of appearances: “As in its political form this spirit 
[fascism] first manifested itself in Italy, it is for this reason that outwardly British 
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Fascism resembles Italian…”
298
 In fact, British fascism was in the process of creating 
something altogether new and unique to Britain. “…inwardly,” Fuller wrote, “it is more 
flexible [than Italian Fascism] and to-day it is rapidly working out a dialectic which 
answers to British character, feelings, and traditions; in short, it is in the process of 
adapting a new revolutionary politics to an old conservative people.”
299
 This was 
precisely the lesson that Fuller had learned from his close exposure to Italian fascism. 
Fascism itself was not the problem, but it was necessary that the fascist movement in 
Britain be ideologically suited to the conditions of British society. This being the case, 
Fuller believed that fascism could quite easily be established in Britain. “My own 
opinion,” he wrote, “is that if in the near future a strong left-wing government is returned 
to power, and should its members commit the egregious blunder of supposing that the 
strength of Great Britain lies in its proletariat, then the chances are that it will be swept 
out of office by a spontaneous Fascist movement, not Italian or German, but British in 
character.”
300
 It seemed to Fuller that this change would not be entirely unwelcome to 
the majority of Britons. The British certainly exhibited an outward hostility to fascism, 
but this was not deep seated. It was rather due to the “ceaseless propaganda mainly on the 
part of the financial interests in this country and the organs they control in order to 
maintain unchallenged their Empire of Money.”
301
 At heart, he argued, “we have always 
been and still are an aristocratic people.”
302
 In short, a people receptive to fascism. “No,” 
Fuller declared,” I do not believe that the people as a whole are hostile to the Fascist 
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system.”
303
 If fascism were only presented in what Fuller considered to be an 
appropriately British guise, in a form adapted to the British character, it would be certain 
not only of political success but of widespread popular support. 
 But, as Fuller reminded us, The First of the League Wars “is not a book on 
Fascism, but a book on war…”
304
 The war in question, of course, was not really the first 
“league war” (the Italo-Ethiopian War), but the implied sequel. It is in his discussion of 
this second, putative, conflict, that Fuller reveals the extent of the evolution of his views 
on foreign fascism – and particularly his strongly positive view of Nazi Germany. The 
appearance of both communism and fascism had left the world divided along ideological 
lines. The nearest parallel to the state of international relations in the mid-1930s was 
Europe at the time of the Wars of Religion. With the emergence of fascism, “it came 
about that that Western democracy, hitherto faced only by Bolshevik Russia, as in the 
early Middle Ages Christendom had been faced by Islam, was politically rent in two; a 
rending as catastrophic to the unity of Europe as once had been Luther’s Reformation.”
305
 
The League of Nations, by attempting to restrict the natural expansion of nations, made 
international conflict inevitable. According to Fuller’s Social Darwinist conception of 
international relations, vital and dynamic nations must have room to grow “naturally.” 
“Unless dynamic nations can peacefully expand,” Fuller wrote, “this cause must, as 
surely as day follows night, lead to international conflict.”
306
 The League of Nation’s 
very dedication to the preservation of peace was thus itself a source of antagonism that 
could lead to war – “…should the supporters of the League have their way, sooner or 
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later a series of ‘religious’ wars will follow the Fascist Reformation, as surely and 
certainly as they followed the Protestant.”
307
 The proximate cause of this revival of the 
wars of religion would be Nazi Germany. Plagued by the restrictions of the Treaty of 
Versailles and denied an outlet for expansion “not only physical but psychological” – 
something that would satisfy Germany’s need both to find a living space for its 
expanding population as well as to satisfy its national prestige – Germany was left with 
few options other than to go to war.
308
  
 Fuller’s comments on Germany reveal the shift in his thought towards greater 
support for Nazism. Hitler, according to Fuller, had set out to remake Germany – in fact, 
to recreate the Holy Roman Empire.
309
 The purpose of this was not territorial hegemony, 
but rather the milder objective of economic control. “When Hitler talks of German 
expansion,” Fuller wrote, “he obviously means economic; which in its turn means, not 
the invasion of political frontiers but the abandonment of tariff barriers.”
310
 In the field of 
domestic policy, Hitler had revitalized Germany, achieving results that “border on the 
miraculous.”
311
 Fuller’s praise for the man himself was unbounded. Hitler appeared to 
him as “the moral noumenon of Germany, that thing-in-itself, that cause of German 
greatness.”
312
 His “ignorance and lack of superficial education” was a positive quality, 
which “freed him from past systems and theories and drove his impetuous spirit onwards 
towards the future.”
313
 The future was, for Fuller, politically totalitarian. Hitler had 
realized that man “is moved by the grandeur of the national spirit, and, in order to sustain 
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it he is willing to sacrifice personal liberty and life itself.”
314
 He had moreover discovered 
the importance of discipline: “He saw that unity was impossible without national 
discipline; hence his regimentation of German life and his return to conscription.”
315
 
These developments were for Fuller wholly praiseworthy. Moreover, he reiterated his 
belief that the guiding principle of Nazi Germany was “common weal before private 
interest” – “and if this is not a sound moral maxim,” he asked, “and also a true 
democratic maxim to base national organization upon, what is?”
316
 The reason for the 
violent persecution of the Jews in Nazi Germany was simply this; Germany maintained 
an economic system according to which commerce was supposed to serve the nation, and 
the profit motive was superseded by the common welfare. “It is for this reason,” Fuller 
suggested, “that the Reich is opposed to international capitalism, and is consequently 
anti-Jewish.”
317
 He moreover did not think that Hitler really desired war with the western 
democracies (although such a war was probably inevitable because of the misguided 
ideals of the League of Nations). Rather, Hitler was preparing for a life or death 
ideological struggle with the Soviet Union.
318
 If a second “league war” were to come, 
however, the western democracies were certain to fare poorly unless they took the 
measures necessary to prepare for the press of “totalitarian warfare” – that is, unless they 
adopted totalitarian governments themselves. 
By the time The First of the League Wars was published, it seemed to Fuller that 
the goal of developing an idiosyncratic British form of fascism was already well on its 
way towards being achieved. Certain fundamental reforms in the British Union of 
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Fascists, put into effect during the first half of 1936, probably account for the change in 
Fuller’s attitude. The most obvious of these reforms was the movement’s change in name 
from the British Union of Fascists to the British Union of Fascists and National 
Socialists, which was commonly reduced to simply “British Union.” The decision to 
present the party publically as just the British Union had the effect of deemphasizing the 
organization’s allegiance to the foreign-sounding “fascism.” “National Socialism,” in 
contrast, could be explained much more easily to an English-speaking audience, drawing 
as it did upon familiar political concepts. 
This superficial change accompanied more significant developments in British 
fascist ideology, which helped to bring the party’s orientation and objectives into line 
with Fuller’s prescriptions. In Fascism – 100 Questions Asked and Answered (1936), 
Oswald Mosley presented an account of the British Union’s program that seemed to 
answer Fuller’s call for a variety of fascism that was fitted to the particular political and 
social conditions in Britain. The short book stressed, for instance, that the British Union 
would seek power “by legal and constitutional means” rather than by violent revolution 
(or counter-revolution).
319
 More to the point, Mosley stated clearly that fascism in Britain 
would be different from either Italian or German fascism because “they are Italian or 
German and…we are British. From this all other differences follow.”
320
 The British 
Union was fundamentally a nationalist movement, and would not imitate any foreign 
model: “we seek to bring the creed of our age to Great Britain by British methods in 
accord with British character.”
321
 This formulation is lifted almost word-for-word from 
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Fuller’s letter to Mosley, to say nothing of Fuller’s discussion of British fascism in The 
First of the League Wars. Mosley’s forceful statement of the independence of British 
fascism from any foreign model was just the sort of thing Fuller wanted to hear.  
Late in the summer, Fuller resumed his correspondence with Mosley on a 
reconciliatory note, commenting sympathetically on the fascist leader’s health and 
providing the address at which he could be reached during the month of August. Fuller 
further suggested that the two should arrange to meet socially if Mosley happened to be 
in the area.
322
 By October, Fuller had resumed his active role in the British Union.  
In November, Fuller decided to take the radical step of standing as the British 
Union candidate for the parliamentary constituency of Westminster St George’s. His ill-
fated candidacy was announced in The Times on November 19, alongside the names of 
eleven other prospective fascist parliamentarians.
323
 The decision to stand as a candidate 
for parliament in many respects represented the culmination of Fuller’s vision for the 
British Union. He had long stressed the necessity for the British fascist movement to 
minimize its paramilitary roots and to seek power according to legal, constitutional 
means. By putting himself forward as a candidate, Fuller was making a substantive effort 
towards the achievement of this goal. The choice of districts was particularly significant. 
The Westminster St George’s seat was held by then-War Secretary Duff Cooper. As by 
far the most illustrious soldier in the British Union, Fuller was no doubt the most 
qualified member of Mosley’s party to contest Cooper’s seat; the election could be fought 
on military questions on which Fuller was an undisputed expert. But although of 
symbolic significance, the decision to stand for parliament as a fascist was a source of 
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considerable hardship for Fuller. As Fuller later complained to Mosley, his writing was 
almost immediately barred from the mainstream press after his name went forward as a 
fascist candidate.
324
 The result was that his work as a journalist – by far his most lucrative 
source of income – was cut back significantly. He was forced to turn in consequence to 
writing books, “which is not only less profitable [than journalism], but…requires far 
more time.”
325
 To make up for his lost journalistic income, he was compelled to work not 
less than ten hours per day throughout much of 1937 – a demanding schedule for a man 
of man of 59.
326
  
In the meantime, however, Fuller threw himself vigorously into his new 
occupation as a prospective politician. He made an effort to build up the British Union 
organization in Westminster St George’s, attending and frequently addressing the 
fortnightly meetings of the local fascist organization.
327
 The substance of Fuller’s 
platform as a parliamentary candidate can be found in a short pamphlet by Fuller entitled 
“What the British Union Has to Offer Britain.”
328
 Although undated, Fuller’s comment 
that the British Union had been active “for a little over four years now” places the 
pamphlet’s date of publication sometime shortly after October 1, 1936, the fourth 
anniversary of the founding of the BUF.
329
 A note in the foreword (written by British 
Union Director of Publicity, John Beckett) that Fuller was “about to visit Spain and 
General Franco” marks out March 1937 as the latest possible date of publication.
330
 The 
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pamphlet therefore appeared around when Fuller had just launched his campaign as a 
parliamentary candidate.  
Although “What the British Union has to Offer Britain” was for the most part a 
streamlined restatement of the British Union platform, the points that Fuller emphasized 
reflected his particular interpretation of British fascist ideology. In particular, the case for 
fascism that Fuller put forward in “What the British Union Has to Offer Britain” drew 
very heavily on the lessons that he had learned as a result of his experiences in Germany 
and Italy – that is, what worked in those countries would not necessarily work in Britain. 
British fascism, he emphasized, would not imitate any foreign model but would rather be 
unique. To suggest that the British Union would seek to copy Italian or German fascism, 
Fuller asserted, “is to say what is impossible.”
331
 Fascism had taken a violent form in 
Germany and Italy “because conditions compelled it to do so.”
332
 Germany, for example, 
had been sent reeling by military defeat and economic collapse. Britain faced altogether 
different challenges. It therefore followed that “our application of the principles of 
Fascism differ [sic] radically.”
333
 The principle way in which the British Union’s 
“application of the principles of Fascism” might be distinguished that of its continental 
forebears was its dedication to a legal and non-violent path to power, and its intention to 
establish a relatively “moderate” dictatorship – both features that Fuller considered to be 
in keeping with the traditions of British politics and society. Oswald Mosley had, Fuller 
suggested, “[tested] out the British and German systems in order to discover how far their 
principles could be adapted to the British character.”
334
 He had in consequence developed 
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an ideology and program that would suit the British people, who were – in contrast to the 
Germans and the Italians – “constitutionally minded” and negatively disposed to 
“upheavals and sudden changes.”
335
 The hypothetical British Union government that 
Fuller described would assume “a form very different from any Continental analogy and 
peculiarly British in character.”
336
 It is a testament to how much the British Union had 
evolved (at least in Fuller’s estimation) throughout 1936, that what he had recommended 
in a private letter to Mosley in February could by the end of the year be declared openly 
as the party’s platform by a British Union parliamentary candidate. The vision of fascism 
that Fuller offered to his prospective constituency had a distinctly British character.  
 
VI. THE COMING OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 
 Much of Fuller’s writing during the latter part of the 1930s was concerned with 
two related themes: the looming threat of war between Germany and Britain, and the 
urgent need for British rearmament. His journalism during this period dealt extensively 
with the diplomatic and military implications of German expansionism. His stance on the 
developing crisis was complicated by his manifest sympathy for Nazi Germany. Fuller 
recognized that many of his fellow countrymen – and indeed the European community as 
a whole – viewed Germany as a major threat to peace. As British attitudes towards Nazi 
Germany hardened in reaction to Hitler’s increasingly flagrant acts of aggression and 
provocation, Fuller consequently became a dedicated activist for the cause of Anglo-
German friendship. Throughout his commentary on the various international crises that 
dominated political discussion between 1937 and 1939, he consistently argued that 
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Britain should acknowledge the supposed legitimacy of Nazi demands and accept the 
consequences of German expansion. Along with Neville Chamberlain, Fuller regarded it 
as absurd that the British people should consider going to war “because of a quarrel in a 
far-away country between people of whom we know nothing.”
337
 It would be far better 
for Britain to recognize that Germany was merely setting right the iniquities of the Treaty 
of Versailles. For too long, the League of Nations had maintained restrictions that 
appeared to Fuller to violate Germany’s natural right to expansion and actualization. 
German aspirations did not in any way pose a threat to British interests. Rather than 
opposing German diplomacy at every turn, Fuller argued, the British government should 
rather seek to maintain friendly relations with Germany and forge an anti-communist 
block, which would stand in opposition to what he regarded as the much greater threat 
posed by the Soviet Union. 
 Even as he threw himself wholeheartedly into advocacy for friendship between 
Germany and Britain, however, Fuller continued to make the case for British 
rearmament. Despite his considerable sympathy for Nazi Germany, Fuller remained a 
British patriot. He hoped to ensure that Britain would be prepared for the next war, which 
he naturally believed would take on the character of “totalitarian warfare.” His 
recommendations for British rearmament thus straddled the line between advocacy for 
political and military reform. In order for Britain to be truly prepared for “totalitarian 
warfare,” Fuller argued, the British government would have to embrace totalitarian 
politics to a large degree. Only a fascist political system would provide Britain with the 
“national discipline” that would provide the only hope of security for the “civil will.” The 
true solution to Britain’s defense problem was therefore not merely the military panacea 
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of mechanization, for which Fuller had argued incessantly throughout much of his career, 
but the rule of a British Union government.  
This was the substance of the argument that Fuller put forward in Towards 
Armageddon: The Defense Problem and Its Solution (1937). This work, which Trythall 
described as Fuller’s “last major polemic,” consisted for the most part of the restatement 
of the ideas that Fuller had expressed in one form or another for almost twenty years.
338
 
In particular, Fuller reiterated his standard discussion of “totalitarian warfare.” Future 
wars would be characterized by lightening-fast airborne attacks against the “civil will.” 
Due to the advancement of military technology, the next war could be won in a single 
blow.  The implications of the new pace of warfare were that nations would have to 
maintain a near-constant state of military readiness. Britain would have to accept drastic 
reforms in order to achieve such a high level of vigilance. The foundations of defense 
included, according to Fuller’s account, “the whole economic and moral structure of the 
country.”
339
 In order for this level of defense coordination to be achieved, it appeared to 
Fuller to be necessary that “nothing other than the Government itself…be the co-
ordinating instrument.”
340
 It followed that the government would have to be changed 
considerably. As in The First of the League Wars, Fuller argued that totalitarian states 
such as Germany and Italy were much better organized to maintain the level of 
coordination necessary in order to wage “totalitarian warfare.”
341
 The success of fascism 
in Britain was therefore a defense imperative: a truly effective defensive organization in 
Britain was impossible, according to Fuller, “until the political system is radically 
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changed.”
342
 Britain’s foremost defense problem was her system of government: “…our 
defense defects are not inherent in the Services themselves, but in our political system,” 
Fuller wrote. “And, until this system is changed, though sheer force of circumstances 
whatever defense system we adopt, we shall be compelled to continue to muddle 
through.”
343
 Even if the British military were brought completely up-to-date – as Fuller 
had demanded throughout much of his career – it would still be inferior to that of 
totalitarian states, for the general population would still be vulnerable to attack, lacking 
the “totalitarian discipline” brought about by “totalitarian politics.”
344
 
Fuller acknowledged that a future “totalitarian war” would most likely involve the 
continental fascist regimes, particularly Germany. He indicated his strong support for 
Hitler, repeating his usual praise for the German dictator’s statesmanship and dedication 
to peace. He also (correctly) predicted the peacetime strategy of expansion through 
diplomatic and military intimidation that Hitler would pursue over the next few years, 
prophesying that the dictator would “cash in on every crisis by what may be called a 
‘passive’ attack; in other words, whenever a crisis arises and the democratic nations are 
thrown into paroxysms of emotionalism, to make so warlike a grimace that he will deflate 
them and gain what he is seeking without firing a shot.”
345
 A “second league war” was 
nevertheless ultimately likely, and would probably emerge from an international 
economic crisis.
346
 This war would be a clash “not between nations, but between 
civilizations,”
347
 and would “decide for an age whether money-making or life-making, 
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whether materialism or spirituality is to be master of Western civilization.”
348
 According 
to Fuller’s view, there were only three possible outcomes to such a war: if it ended in a 
draw (between Germany and her opponents), a resumption of the war would ultimately 
be inevitable; if Germany won, her enemies would be overcome either by fascist or 
communist revolutions; if Germany lost, the inevitable result would be the triumph of 
communism, “for if National Socialism goes under what other philosophy can replace 
it?”
349
 It seemed to Fuller to be absolutely inconceivable that a “totalitarian” war 
involving Germany could result in a victory for democracy. Such a result was impossible 
according to Fuller’s conception of the relationship between scientific development and 
political philosophy. “To imagine that revolution will take on a conventional democratic 
form,” Fuller declared, “is to think in terms which are already nearly a hundred years out 
of date.”
350
 Fuller’s comments on the outcome of a potential European war shed 
considerable light on his subsequent activism in favor of peace between Germany and 
Britain. Believing that a German defeat in a second Great War would result in a victory 
for communism, he regarded such a war as a disaster to be avoided by any means 
necessary. 
Towards the end of 1937, the British government began a series of military 
reforms that won Fuller’s cautious approval. In December, he lauded the decision of 
Leslie Hore-Belisha, the Secretary of State for War – who was at that time advised 
unofficially by Fuller’s friend and fellow advocate for mechanization, Captain B. H. 
Liddell Hart – to replace the leadership of the Army Council, which had been dominated 
by older generals who were in the “last lap” of their military service, with a group of 
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significantly younger officers.
351
 This represented an important step towards military 
reform for, as Fuller had long argued, youthful leadership was essential to effective 
military organization. He suggested that this reform would be the first of many under the 
competent direction of “our young Secretary of State for War.”
352
 By March 1938, Fuller 
was sufficiently impressed with Britain’s progress towards rearmament that he 
acknowledged, in a letter to Mosley, that the basic issue on which his parliamentary 
campaign in Westminster St George’s was being fought had been effectively answered. 
“When I agreed to my name going forward [as a candidate for parliament] Duff Cooper 
was Secretary of State for War and the defenses of this country were in a perilous 
condition,” Fuller wrote. “Since then he has left the War Office, and the vast re-
armament scheme, now in progress, has knocked the main props from under my feet; for 
my sole value as a prospective candidate is my knowledge of the defense question.”
353
 
This was a remarkable admission, for the changes in British defense policy had been 
made under the leadership of a Jewish Secretary of State. 
Fuller thus brought his abortive foray into parliamentary politics to a close. In 
addition to the new program of rearmament, he suggested that a number of other factors 
contributed to make his campaign unviable. He was too old to muster the effort necessary 
to lead a successful campaign, for “what is wanted is a younger man than myself and one 
who can give far more time to the work than I can.”
354
 He felt that he had not made 
sufficient progress towards the creation of a significant base of constituents. He had 
hoped to double the British Union membership in Westminster Saint Georges every 
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twelve months, an objective that appeared to be necessary if he was to have any hope of 
saving his deposit. This goal was nevertheless very far from being met “for the 
membership has remained approximately what it was when I began.”
355
 Fuller moreover 
criticized the British Union’s overall electoral strategy. The experience of campaigning 
had only confirmed his belief that the “surest road to success does not lie in a frontal 
attack on all constituencies, but solely in a carefully prepared flank attack on a selected 
number, namely the distressed areas – industrial and agricultural.”
356
 The British Union 
had little hope of gaining a foothold of parliament – what Fuller had always regarded as 
British fascist movement’s best route to power – if it continued to attempt to contest a 
large number of parliamentary constituencies simultaneously. “It is the bottom 
constituencies which will put the Movement into power,” Fuller declared, “therefore let 
us concentrate on them.”
357
 Mosley wrote a brief letter in reply, thanking Fuller for his 
hard work and agreeing that his candidacy had been undermined by Duff Cooper’s 
departure from the position of Secretary of State for War. He stated that Fuller would be 
welcome to stand as a British Union candidate in the future, if he so desired. He 
moreover acknowledged the validity of Fuller’s criticism of the British Union electoral 
strategy. “I agree with you in the principle of concentration on the most likely 
constituencies,” he wrote. “We should only extend our attack as funds became ample – 
which is not a common condition in a Fascist Movement!”
358
  
By withdrawing from his parliamentary candidacy, Fuller ended the period of his 
most active participation in the British Union of Fascists. This was nevertheless by no 
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means the end of Fuller’s involvement with the British far right. In the last year and a half 
before the beginning of the Second World War, Fuller was in fact increasingly involved 
in the most extreme fringe of British right wing politics. He became closely associating 
with high profile efforts to foster friendship between Britain and Nazi Germany just as 
Hitler’s regime was beginning to be widely recognized as a major threat to civilization. 
While Fuller continued his association with the British Union to some extent, writing a 
number of articles for British Union journals such as Action, his political activities during 
the last years of the 1930s were most of all connected with the most radical British anti-
Semitic and pro-Nazi organizations. Foremost among these was the Nordic League, a 
shadowy organization that was originally established in 1937 as an outgrowth of the 
White Knights of Britain (which Richard Thurlow described as a “British 1930s version 
of the Ku Klux Klan”).
359
 This organization maintained a low profile throughout much of 
its existence, and was heavily influenced by Archibald Maule Ramsay, a major figure on 
the British far right.
360
 Throughout 1938 its activities were mainly confined to secret 
meetings. It emerged briefly in 1939, holding “several public meetings in London of a 
pro-nazi or pro-appeasement character.”
361
 The Nordic League’s most prominent 
characteristic was its extreme anti-Semitism, which was expressed through the toast 
“P.J.” or “Perish Judah.”
362
 The membership, which included such far-right luminaries as 
William Joyce and A. K. Chesterton, was known to promote a “genocidal solution to the 
so-called Jewish question…”
363
 The Nordic League was regarded by the British Security 
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Service as a seditious body.
364
 Even Oswald Mosley considered the organization to be too 
extreme, refusing to involve himself or the British Union with the Nordic League.
365
 In 
Thomas Linehan’s expression, the Nordic League was “probably the most fanatical and 
malevolent of the late 1930s pro-Nazi anti-war groups.”
366
 Fuller’s involvement with 
such an organization is indicative of the extent of his pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic sentiment 
during the final years of the 1930s. 
Aside from the Nordic League, Fuller was involved in several other pro-Nazi and 
anti-war groups. These organizations included the Link, the membership of which 
consisted of a wide range of German sympathizers, from “the most innocent of provincial 
pro-Germanists to convinced pro-Nazis of a fairly disquieting kind.”
367
 Fuller became 
most active in the Link in 1939, speaking before the Central London division – “the most 
clearly pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic branch” – on several occasions.
368
 Later in 1939, Fuller 
became involved with the efforts by the Conservative MP, Lieutenant Colonel J. T. C. 
Moore-Brabazon, to coordinate advocacy for peace between Britain and Germany.
369
 
Fuller was also associated with the British Council Against European Commitments, a 
minor pro-peace organization whose membership included a number of people were 
associated with the BUF. Fuller’s participation in these various organizations is difficult 
to assess. The history of the most extreme groups, particularly the Nordic League, is 
shrouded in secrecy. Documentation of their activities is relatively scarce, what little 
there is coming primarily from British Special Branch observation.
370
 Fuller, 
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unsurprisingly, left little record of his own participation in most of these groups. All that 
can be said with real certainty is that J. F. C. Fuller was a member of a number of the 
most extreme pro-Nazi organizations in Britain on the eve of the Second World War. 
Fuller’s public activities – and his published writing in particular – nevertheless 
provide extensive evidence for his pro-Nazi and pro-peace views on the eve of the 
Second World War. In January 1938, he presented an overview of his thoughts on 
international affairs in an article entitled, “On What Should Our Foreign Policy Be 
Based?”
371
 He criticized Britain’s established foreign policy heavily, arguing that 
“Baldwinism” had led to the unfortunate state of affairs in which much of the world was 
hostile to the British government. Fuller argued that Britain should avoid taking sides “in 
a world divided into irremovable obstacles and irresistible forces.”
372
 The British 
government needed to recognize the vulnerability of the empire’s globe-spanning 
“Imperial backbone.” Britain should at all costs avoid antagonizing those nations – 
including Japan, Italy, France, Spain, Germany and the USA – that were capable of 
posing the most direct threat to the integrity of the British Empire. In the case of 
Germany specifically, Fuller recommended that Britain pursue a policy of appeasement, 
arguing that Britain should acquiesce to Hitler’s demand for the return of Germany’s 
former colonies.
373
 In March, Fuller came out firmly in favor of appeasement, applauding 
the German annexation of Austria as a decisive blow against the international order 
represented by the League of Nations.
374
 In light of the new strategic situation in the 
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Mediterranean created by the Anschluss, Fuller recommended that Britain pursue 
friendship with Italy and Germany.
375
 
Later in the spring, Fuller commented on the developing Czechoslovakian crisis, 
speculating that Britain’s defensive agreement with France was “in my opinion, the first 
definite step taken since the signing of the peace treaties in 1919, towards war…”
376
 
Fuller feared that this move, taken at the same time as Germany was beginning to put 
intensive pressure on Czechoslovakia over the Sudeten question, would provoke a 
resurgence of the German fears of strategic encirclement which had precipitated the First 
World War.
377
 In spite of Hore-Belisha’s military reforms, Fuller believed that Britain 
was still unprepared for war. He therefore recommended that Chamberlain’s government 
accept the German demands in Czechoslovakia, as failure to do so could very easily lead 
to military catastrophe. In the wake of the Munich Agreement in October, Fuller praised 
the Chamberlain’s response to the Czechoslovakian crisis, suggesting that a general 
European war had only narrowly been avoided.
378
 The Munich Agreement had been the 
product of the collective common sense of the “silent majority” of the British, French, 
German and Italian peoples. By handing the Sudetenland over to Hitler, the negotiators 
had “heroically and wisely extinguished the flames of war, and so prevented the 
European nations tearing themselves to pieces like a pack of starving wolves.”
379
 If the 
negotiations had failed, war would have meant disaster for both Britain and France – 
Germany, fighting alongside Italy, would probably have achieved “a second Sedan on a 
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gigantic scale.”
380
 In order to ensure that such an outcome would not result from a future 
conflict, Britain would have to embrace totalitarian political organization, not in imitation 
of Italy or Germany “but in our own British way…”
381
 
During the early months of 1939 it became increasingly clear that the Munich 
Agreement had not extinguished the “flames of war” altogether. In the aftermath of the 
German occupation of Czechoslovakia, British public opinion turned decisively against 
appeasement.
382
 By the end of March, Neville Chamberlain had announced that Britain 
would guarantee the independence of Poland, which by then appeared to be the next 
target for German expansion.
383
 The British government’s policy of appeasement was 
brought effectively to an end. Throughout this period, J. F. C. Fuller’s efforts to promote 
friendship between Germany and Britain intensified. His activism in favor of peace 
between Britain and Germany was put to effective use by the Nazi regime. Fuller’s 
comments on international affairs were quoted with approval in the Völkischer 
Beobachter as early as September 1938.
384
 In February 1939, Fuller travelled to Berlin, 
sitting for an interview with a German reporter during his stay in the Kaiserhof Hotel.
385
 
The resulting article appeared on the front page of B. Z. am Mittag. Fuller expressed 
sympathy with Hitler’s efforts to overturn the international order forged in the aftermath 
of the First World War, describing himself “als einen der ersten Angreifer gegen 
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Versailles.”
 386
  War between Germany and Britain, he insisted, should be avoided at all 
costs.
387
  
In April, Fuller’s ceaseless advocacy on behalf of Anglo-German friendship 
earned him an invitation to Hitler’s fiftieth birthday celebration in Berlin. Fuller was one 
of only two Britons who appeared as official guests of the German dictator. His excursion 
to Germany was announced in The Times on April 19, the article noting that Fuller’s 
“views on democratic institutions have of late received prominent and favorable notice in 
the German press…”
388
  On April 20, Fuller observed the German military parade. The 
News Review described the scene: 
Face to face with the Fuehrer, though separated from him by the sixty-yards-wide 
Avenue of Triumph, sat explosive old English warrior Major-General John Frederick 
Charles Fuller. Wearing a plain grey top-hat among the respondent [sic] uniforms of his 
fellow-guests, he looked somewhat like a cheeky mouse on a gaudy-hued patchwork 
quilt…At present Major-General Fuller is distinguished by his Polish wife Sonia, his 
Poona moustache, and his cosmopolitan collection of decorations, including the DSO, 
Légion d’Honneur and Order of Leopold of Belgium.
389
 
 
According to Fuller’s account, he met with Hitler shortly after the parade: “He walked 
down the line, and when he came opposite to me he shook me by the hand and said: ‘I 
hope you were pleased with your children?’ To which I answered: ‘Your Excellency, 
they have grown up so quickly that I no longer recognize them’, which was true.”
390
  
A few days later, The Times published a short letter by Fuller in which he stated 
the essence of his case for fascism and for peace in condensed form.
391
 Denying that he 
was opposed to democracy, Fuller declared that he was really only opposed to 
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Bolshevism and what he termed “pluto-mobocracy.”
392
 He acknowledged that he was 
frequently called a fascist, stating that he had no objection to that epithet “when ‘British’ 
is placed before this at present popular expression of abuse…”
393
 He stated his belief that 
a “new political idea, expressing itself as Fascism, National Socialism, &c., 
is…inevitable.”
394
 It was in consequence necessary that Britain “swim with the out-
flowing tide of this great political change, or else be wrecked on the shore of self-
fashioned ruin.”
395
 He furthermore expressed his concern that Britain would be led into a 
new war in alliance with the Soviet Union, “in my opinion the ultimate end of all pluto-
mobocracies.”
396
 Fuller hoped above all that Britain would not be forced into a war on the 
side of the Soviet Union against the continental fascist states. “Democrat or Fascist,” 
Fuller wrote, “we are a God-fearing people, and at least several millions of us are still to 
be found who are revolted by the idea of an alliance with Anti-Christ.”
397
 
 Fuller made a last-ditch appeal for peace during the final months before the 
outbreak of the Second World War. In Action, he declared that it would be impossible for 
Britain to keep its guarantee to Poland, and that a war in defense of Polish independence 
would therefore be futile.
398
 Britain would have to undergo drastic political 
reorganization if it was to have any chance of victory. “If we are to beat Germany,” 
Fuller declared, “we have got to become Totalitarians, lock, stock and barrel…”
399
 If 
Britain and Germany went to war, Britain would be unlikely to survive an extended 
conflict. Britain was not yet economically self sufficient, and would thus be worn down 
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over the course of a long war. It was therefore imperative that Britain do whatever 
possible to avoid a war with Germany.
400
 Fuller’s last minute efforts to maintain peace 
were very rapidly overwhelmed by international events. The day after the German army 
crossed the Polish border, Fuller wrote an article condemning the folly of British 
statesmanship.  Britain, he declared, was entering an unwinnable war for an unworthy 
cause: “We are risking our pants for a trouser button.”
401
  
  
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
Fuller’s political activities, like those of the British fascist movement as a whole, 
continued on ineffectually throughout the duration of the Phony War (September 1939 – 
May 1940). On September 27, he met with the CIGS, General Ironside, who indicated 
that Fuller was being seriously considered for the position of Deputy Chief of the 
Imperial General Staff. Fuller’s open political commitments however proved to be a 
insurmountable obstacle to his reemployment at the War Office, and the offer was 
subsequently withdrawn.
402
 Fuller still hoped that Germany and Britain could reach an 
honorable peace agreement that would leave the British Empire intact and the European 
continent mostly unscathed. Like Mosley himself, Fuller persisted in his belief that it was 
possible to be both a British fascist and a British patriot. In his published commentary on 
the war, Fuller retained his sympathetic view of Nazi Germany to a significant degree. 
His treatment of Hitler’s war effort avoided any hint of moral condemnation. In 
November 1939, he went so far as to write a brief article in which he attempted to dismiss 
the lurid rumors then circulating about the treatment of Jewish prisoners in German 
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concentration camps. During his visit to Germany that February, he had apparently asked 
his guides on a whim if he could see one of the camps. He was consequently admitted to 
Sachsenhausen in Oranienburg, a site that neither the British Ambassador nor the British 
Chargé d’Affaires in Berlin had been allowed to visit. Stating that he had seen 
“practically every hut and building in the camp,” Fuller declared that everything had been 
“spotlessly clean and orderly.”
403
 The conditions were apparently quite comfortable, and 
the prisoners were well fed. He saw no conspicuous signs of ill-treatment. Nevertheless, 
he concluded his article on a profoundly ominous note, describing the prisoners that he 
had seen as deformed and misshapen. “Therefore,” he wrote, “I could not help feeling 
that, whether these concentration camps are barbarous or not, a civilization which 
produces such creatures [as the prisoners] is one to be fought against rather than to be 
fought for.”
404
 
 The events of the following summer made it clear that there could be no 
settlement between Britain and Germany. The British Union continued to advocate for 
peace throughout the spring, even enjoying a modest increase in popularity.
405
 In the 
chaotic weeks following the German invasion of France, however, Winston Churchill’s 
newly-inaugurated government took decisive steps to curtail the fascist movement in 
Britain. The instrument by which this was achieved was the Emergency Powers Act, 
which had been introduced in September 1939. According to the original wording of the 
act, the Home Secretary was empowered to detain “anyone he had reason to suspect of 
hostile associations or involvement in ‘acts prejudicial to public safety or the defense of 
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the realm.’”
406
 In May 1940, the cabinet amended Regulation 18b of the Emergency 
Powers Act to allow for the “detention of members of organizations ‘subject to foreign 
influence or control’ or whose members ‘have or have had association with persons 
concerned in the government of, or sympathetic with the system of government of, any 
power with which His Majesty is at war.’”
407
 The British Union was immediately 
targeted, and nearly all of the prominent leaders of the organization were arrested along 
with a significant portion of the membership. J. F. C. Fuller was a singular exception. In 
spite of his open association with the BUF and his very high profile stance in support of 
Nazi Germany – not to mention his well-publicized meetings with Hitler and Mussolini – 
he was never detained. As Martin Pugh noted, “Fuller’s record in the BUF, as one of its 
candidates, as a contributor to fascist journals, and as a member of the Domvile-Ramsay 
circle during the war made him an obvious candidate for detainment under Regulation 
18b.”
408
 Many were arrested for less. Fuller’s friend Captain B. H. Liddell Hart believed 
that Churchill had intervened personally on Fuller’s behalf.
409
 At any rate, Fuller seemed 
to recognize that he had been granted an unlikely (and undeserved) reprieve. He cut back 
the political tendency in his writing significantly, and confined his journalism to purely 
military topics throughout the remainder of the war. With the exception of a brief period 
in 1945 during which he publically opposed the trial of German military personnel as war 
criminals,
410
 Fuller made a concerted effort to reinvent himself as a largely apolitical 
military historian after the Second World War.   
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 Fuller’s efforts to downplay his involvement in fascism were for the most part 
successful, at least in the short term. By the time of his death in 1966, his open 
identification with fascism during the 1930s was widely regarded as an aberration – a 
deplorable, but ultimately excusable lapse in judgment. Although historians of British 
fascism have since recognized the extent of his ideological commitment to fascism as 
well as the significance of his role in the BUF, the myth of the 1930s as a “lost decade” in 
Fuller’s life has been remarkably persistent in much of the scholarship on J. F. C. Fuller 
himself.  The deficiencies within the literature on J. F. C. Fuller, combined with the 
fragmentary nature of much of the evidence related to Fuller’s activities during the 1930s, 
have in turn caused much of the writing about Fuller’s participation in the British fascist 
movement to be incomplete and contradictory. This paper has attempted to set the record 
straight on Fuller’s involvement with the British fascist movement, and thereby improve 
our understanding of one of the most important figures in the history both of British 
fascism and of the British military.  
 In A. J. Trythall’s phrase, J. F. C. Fuller was an “intellectual fascist.”
411
 This 
description is at least partly accurate. Fuller aligned himself with Mosley and the British 
Union of Fascists because he believed that fascism was the political philosophy that gave 
expression to the scientific nature of the modern age. The BUF promised strong and 
decisive minority rule with a distinctly technocratic character. To Fuller, who in 1934 
was thoroughly disillusioned with the military and political system that had failed to 
recognize the merits of his ideas – to say nothing of his own personal merits – Mosley’s 
movement appeared to offer a way forward for Britain. Fuller threw himself 
wholeheartedly into fascist politics, attempting to reorganize the BUF into a legitimate 
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parliamentary party as opposed to a violent paramilitary movement. He moreover strove 
to build up the intellectual content of British fascism, believing (characteristically) that a 
sound theoretical foundation was a necessary condition for effective political action. 
Experience with foreign fascism, particularly during the Italian-Ethiopian War, 
convinced him that what worked on the European continent would not necessarily work 
for the British people. Rather than abandoning fascism entirely, Fuller set about purging 
the British fascist movement of those foreign elements that he believed were unsuited to 
political conditions in Britain. In particular, he insisted that that Mosley’s movement 
dedicate itself entirely to pursuing power through constitutional means. He ultimately 
demonstrated his belief in the parliamentary route to power by standing, albeit 
unsuccessfully, as a British Union candidate for parliament.  
Fuller’s faith in fascism was also strongly connected to his military thought, and 
indeed represented a synthesis of his political, military and even spiritual theories. 
Developments in military technology and tactics had produced a new style of warfare – 
what he termed “totalitarian warfare” – the outstanding feature of which was the terror 
bombing of civilian populations. If the morale of national populations could be attacked 
directly from the air, it was possible that states could be overwhelming and defeated 
within days or even hours. The protection of the “civil will” was therefore a defensive 
imperative, and Fuller was certain that fascism, through its emphasis on the order and 
discipline of the nation as a whole, provided the surest guarantee of security.  
 Although Fuller played an important role in the effort to remove foreign elements 
from British fascist ideology and to reorganize the BUF as a traditional parliamentary 
party, Brian Holden Reid’s judgment that “the general contribution of Fuller to the BUF 
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was to try and enhance its respectability and not to create a British Nazi Party”
412
 requires 
some modification. Fuller was associated with some of the most radical elements on the 
British right wing. In his published writing, he declared his support for an extreme (if 
idiosyncratic) variety of conspiratorial anti-Semitism. He promoted the idea that the Jews 
were the true power behind communism in the Soviet Union – and indeed behind many 
ills throughout western history. Moreover, he became a strong supporter of Hitler and 
Nazi Germany, particularly during the latter part of the 1930s. While he never argued that 
Nazi ideology should be imported to Britain, he did campaign actively for Anglo-German 
friendship even up to the very beginning of the Second World War. Fuller’s efforts to 
prevent war with Germany led him to associate himself with some of the most radical 
organizations on the fringes of British politics, particularly the secretive Nordic League. 
The precise nature of Fuller’s participation in British fascism is therefore ambivalent. 
While on the one hand he was an important advocate for moderation and even 
intellectualization in the BUF, one the other hand he provided legitimacy and support to 
some of the most radical elements of the British fascist movement and of fascist ideology 
in general.  
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